Without solutions… September 30th is approaching and dialogue dominates the relationship with the factions
Without solutions… September 30th is approaching and dialogue dominates the relationship with the factions
2026-08-28
Shafaq News – Baghdad/Tehran
Only 34 days remain until September 30, 2026, the date set for the end of the international coalition’s mission in Iraq, while the issue of restricting weapons to the state stands before a crucial challenge between a government confirmation of proceeding with the project, advanced dialogues with the factions, and a difference of opinion regarding whether the date represents the end of the deadline for handing over weapons or the beginning of a new phase for organizing and managing them.
After the Iraqi government confirmed on August 21 that September 30 would be the date for the weapons inventory, National Security Advisor Qasim al-Araji returned two days later to confirm that the date pertains to the end of the coalition’s presence, and that the weapons inventory process would begin gradually after that.
On Thursday, the spokesman for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Sabah al-Nu’man, stressed the continuation of the dialogues, saying that the Central Committee had made great progress on the issue.
Agree in principle
In this context, Hassan Fad’am, a leader in the Wisdom Movement led by Ammar al-Hakim, says that restricting weapons to the state has become part of the government program, the project of the political forces, the demands of the religious authority, and the supreme interest of Iraq, stressing that “all parties” agree on the principle, including the parties of the armed factions.
Fadaam adds to Shafaq News Agency that the disagreements, if any, relate to the timing and mechanisms of implementation, noting that the dialogue with the factions is “advanced” and at good levels, and that no faction announces its rejection of the principle of restricting weapons to the state.
Fadaam believes that the post-September 30th phase may make the dialogue “more serious and clear” in order to reach a decision on implementation.
This partially matches what Al-Nu’man announced on Thursday, when he said that the armed forces had not encountered “any rejection” from the factions, and that the dialogues were ongoing and had made significant progress, with the preparation of a database of affiliates and the classification of weapons and their transfer to designated warehouses.
Dispossession compensation management
In this regard, security expert Adnan al-Kinani says that the government’s insistence on strengthening state authority and restricting the carrying of weapons to legally authorized entities is clear, but at the same time he points to demands from some resistance factions to postpone the operation, out of fears of developments that may target Iraq.
Al-Kinani, speaking to Shafaq News Agency, believes that the real danger lies in weapons remaining outside the authority of the state, considering that public confidence is greater when the armed forces are subject to official institutions.
But the solution, in his estimation, should not lead to a clash, as it calls for understandings that allow armed factions to join official formations, whether in the Popular Mobilization Forces or the armed forces, in a way that preserves their expertise and prevents the process of restricting weapons from turning into a direct threat to their lives.
He adds that the resistance can look for “alternative channels” to play its political and national role, while simultaneously protecting the lives of its members from being targeted, warning that external pressures could push the street into a dangerous slide.
This formula is consistent with what political sources told Shafaq News Agency on August 23, regarding replacing the concept of “disarmament” with “weapons management,” and subjecting its use to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, in addition to linking the arrangements for transferring weapons to the withdrawal of foreign forces and the approval of the service and retirement law for the Popular Mobilization Forces.
In the same context, a source within the coordination framework revealed to Shafaq News Agency at the time an understanding stipulating that the weapons handed over by the factions could be transferred to the Popular Mobilization Forces’ warehouses, and not necessarily to the warehouses of the Ministries of Defense or Interior, within the framework of “weapons management” arrangements.
The source also indicated a political consensus to expedite the enactment of the Civil Service and Retirement Law for the Popular Mobilization Forces, addressing ranks, career progression, the rights of martyrs and the wounded, and the general structure of the institution.
The state strengthens its tools
In parallel with the political dialogue, signs began to emerge of the state institutions’ readiness for a more stringent phase. On Wednesday, the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, Faiq Zaidan, discussed with the US Chargé d’Affaires, Joshua Harris, the judicial procedures related to entities and individuals who carry weapons in violation of the constitution and the law, and the mechanisms for enforcing the rule of law after the end of the coalition’s mission.
On Thursday, Iraqi forces confirmed that regulating and restricting weapons to the state is a “sovereign demand,” coinciding with confirmation that the withdrawal of coalition forces is accelerating according to the set schedule.
The Ministry of Defense is also working to enhance air defense capabilities, as part of preparations for the next security phase, while the security services announced on the same day (Thursday) that they had thwarted an attempt to manufacture drones inside Baghdad.
Between surrender and holding on
However, the position within the factions is not unified. Saraya al-Salam, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali have expressed their readiness to reorganize their relationship with official institutions, while consultations continue with other factions, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, according to information provided by political and media sources during August.
On August 21, an informed source told Shafaq News Agency that Asaib Ahl al-Haq had handed over weapons at one of its headquarters south of Baghdad, including drones, in an operation that he said took place in the presence of a committee that included representatives from the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of Defense, the National Security Advisory, and the Popular Mobilization Forces.
In contrast, other factions declared their adherence to what they call the “weapon of resistance,” and linked the future of this weapon to the withdrawal of foreign forces and ensuring Iraq’s ability to protect itself from external attacks.
Regional dimension
The issue of weapons is not limited to its internal borders, as it is also linked to broader security transformations in the region. Dr. Ardeshir Bishnak, senior researcher at the Center for Strategic Studies and the Iranian Association for West Asian Studies, believes that the issue of Iraqi weapons cannot be separated from the transformations that the security system in the Middle East has witnessed since Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.
Bashanak told Shafaq News Agency that Iraq has tried in recent years to maintain a practical balance between Iran and the United States, at a time when its territory has turned more than once into an arena for competition between the two sides.
According to Bishnak, the issue of the state’s monopoly on the use of force has become a challenge for the government. On the one hand, Baghdad wants to prevent any faction from making an independent military decision, and on the other hand, it does not want the process of controlling the factions to become a factor that restores instability in light of regional tension.
He believes that the end of the American military mission could provide Baghdad with an opportunity to remove one of the arguments used to justify the continued presence of weapons outside the direct control of the state, while strengthening state authority would reduce the likelihood of Iraqi territory being used in regional conflicts.
Bashang concludes that Baghdad’s success in combining the institutional status of the Popular Mobilization Forces with a unified chain of command under state authority could enhance Iraq’s sovereignty and stability and open up more space for an independent foreign policy, while failure could leave Iraq vulnerable to becoming an arena for regional confrontation.
shafaq.com
