The end of the Shiite-Kurdish alliance in Iraq: Building a new state or repeating the experience of governance?

The end of the Shiite-Kurdish alliance in Iraq: Building a new state or repeating the experience of governance?

2026-03-22

Diyar Tayeb Barwari
The Shiites and the Kurds have close political and social ties, mainly as a result of the persecution and injustice they experienced together after the establishment of Iraq by the British in mid-1921. Their greatest achievement was the end of the Baath Party’s rule and the Shiites taking control of affairs in Iraq, and the Kurds gaining federal governance and participation in the administration of the state, which was achieved by the American armed forces in 2003 in an operation called the liberation of Iraq. Building this alliance was important for both sides during the previous period and the establishment of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005. However, throughout this period of Shiite rule, there were disputes and confrontations between the two sides, accompanied by the inability of the Shiites to implement important articles for the Kurds in the Constitution, including the establishment of the Federal Council, the implementation of Article 140, the enactment of the Oil and Gas Law, the separation of the powers of the federal government and the regional government, the region’s budget from the federal budget, and the powers of the Peshmerga. Now, anyone following the political situation in Iraq can be sure that the Shiite-Kurdish alliance is breathing its last and may depart, leaving history to record that the political opposition to the Baath regime was unable to win its political battle after the international coalition forces provided them with an opportunity they could not have dreamed of.

The beginning is from the wise man:

It can be noted that the relationship between the Kurds and the Shiites in Iraq was positive in principle, as the Sunnis were in power and the Shiites and Kurds lived in the shadows in an Iraq that did not guarantee them citizenship rights or true dignity. Also, many Shiite intellectuals were within the formations of the Iraqi Communist Party, which was an ally of the Kurdish parties, especially the Kurdistan Democratic Party. Mr. Masoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, refers to the historical relationship between the Kurds and the Shiites in the fatwa issued by Mr. Mohsen Al-Hakim when the Iraqi government asked him to issue a fatwa to kill the Kurds because they were infidels and outlaws during the September Revolution of 1961-1970. During his visit to the holy city of Karbala on the fortieth day of Imam Hussein (peace be upon him) in 1964, he held an important meeting in which he announced his famous fatwa prohibiting the fighting of the Kurds, in which he said: “The Kurds are Muslims, and it is not permissible to fight them, and their issue must be dealt with through dialogue and peaceful means.”

The opposition alliance:

Although the Shia were opposed to the regimes that ruled Iraq, especially the Ba’athist regime, the Kurds, from the very beginning of the Iraqi state’s establishment, were engaged in continuous political and military activity until the Ba’athist regime was overthrown in 2003 by the international coalition forces. They shared a common interest in Iran as their protector and safe haven, as most of their military and political operations were launched from Iranian territory. It can be noted that Iran benefited from this support and had projects in Iraq that it hoped to realize through these two partners. However, there were fundamental, inherent differences between the two groups. The support for the Shiites was in order to establish the philosophy of exporting the revolution and to transform Iraq into being under the shadow of the Islamic Republic of Iran and participating in spreading the principle of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist among the Shiites in general. But the Kurds were on the other side of the equation, related to national rights. The agreement that the Kurds obtained, which guaranteed them autonomy in the Republic of Iraq, and which is considered one of the achievements of the Kurdish revolution led by Mustafa Barzani in 1970, this agreement and this type of autonomy was a warning bell and a threat to Iran, in which the Kurds constitute no less than 25% of the population of Iran and are present in a large area of ​​northern and northwestern Iran. The success of this experiment represents a danger to the administration of the state in Iran and is contrary to the philosophy of Shiite rule in it.

In an article published on Al-Arabiya website on January 27, 2024, Sarkis Naoum states that the relationship between the two main Iraqi groups, the Kurds and the Shiites, has always been good. According to Iraqi experts and American observers, this is due to the oppression both groups suffered under the Iraqi regime, particularly after the Ba’ath Party seized power. It appears that no definitive negative developments have occurred in this relationship since the fall of Saddam Hussein at the hands of US forces and the establishment of a new regime. The Shiites felt that this new regime was more equitable, as it allowed them, as the majority, to participate in power alongside other Iraqi groups. The Kurds shared this sentiment, as they exercised a degree of autonomy under the new regime, leading many to believe they were living in an independent state.

Naoum concludes that the Shiite-Kurdish alliance represents cooperation between the Shiite and Kurdish components in Iraq. This alliance typically seeks to achieve shared political and economic goals and promote regional stability. This cooperation can encompass areas such as resource management, minority rights, and power-sharing. The alliance’s evolution depends on internal and regional political and economic conditions.

The image and the weak alliance:

There is a photograph that brings together Adel Abdul Mahdi, Jalal Talabani, Nouri al-Maliki, and Masoud Barzani, which can be metaphorically symbolized by the (Shia-Kurdish) alliance. This alliance represents the two Shia parties, the Supreme Islamic Council and the Dawa Party, and the two Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party. It was formed in 2007 to overcome the government crisis that Maliki was leading. This crisis primarily arose after the Sunni Iraqi Accord Front announced its withdrawal from the government in protest against the government’s failure to respond to its demands, most notably granting it a greater role in decision-making, releasing detainees, disbanding militias, and rebuilding the army. This alliance, which began strongly, decisively, and morally, weakened as issues remained unresolved between the two sides and escalating into sectarian and personal attacks.

From London to Baghdad:

In this regard, it can be noted that the Iraqi opposition conference held abroad in the early nineties and early millennia witnessed several important meetings and conferences, including the London Conference of 2002, which established a federal democratic system in Iraq. Among the most prominent of these resolutions, which represent the Iraqi opposition’s vision for the future of Iraq after the fall of the regime, was the following:

1- Overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s regime: Emphasizing the need for joint action to overthrow the Baath regime.

2- Forming the Transitional Governing Council: Focusing on establishing a body that represents all components of the Iraqi people.

3- Democracy and Human Rights: Commitment to the principles of democracy and guaranteeing human rights for all Iraqis.

4- National Unity: Strengthening the unity of Iraq among all its components (Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds).

5- Returning to Iraq and Political Participation: Inviting Iraqi opposition members abroad to return and participate in building the new Iraq.

It can be said that one of the most prominent milestones of the success of the Shiite-Kurdish alliance was the agreement of the Kurdish and Shiite parties to pass the 2005 constitution. The matter did not stop there, but the forces of the Kurdistan Alliance supported Nouri al-Maliki’s assumption of the position of Prime Minister in his first term in 2006, and then they repeated this support in 2010, even though the State of Law Coalition was not leading in parliamentary seats.

The alliance between the two sides continued in its previous form, with occasional skirmishes and disagreements here and there, until October 16, 2017, when Iraqi forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces took control of the Anjar region and the city of Kirkuk, thus reasserting their control over the city, which had been under the control of the Kurdistan Region since 2003.

Disagreements surfaced sharply with the Iraqi parliament’s decision demanding the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, despite opposition from Sunni Arabs and Kurds. This issue marked the beginning of the end for the historic 17-year Kurdish-Shia alliance. Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani told Al-Monitor, “The Kurds and Sunni Arabs did not participate in the decision,” considering this a dangerous precedent. Over the past few months, Shia parliamentarians have called for cutting off federal funding to the Kurdistan Region due to its failure to disclose its oil sales figures and its non-payment of oil revenues to the federal government.

In an article by Subhi Salhi entitled (Do you remember the Shiite-Kurdish alliance?) published on the Shafaq News website on 9/17/2027, (After the fall of Saddam, without setting specific mechanisms and without written guarantees guaranteed by a third party that could protect the process from deviation, and without sufficient justification for rebuilding the state and the army, forming the government in Baghdad, and writing the constitution, the Kurds entered into a partnership or a game whose results they do not know, and they do not know that the participants in it are discordant forces that love exploitation, become arrogant when they gain power, transgress the rules, and monopolize the decision when they possess authority).

He added, “With that partnership, the term ‘Shia-Kurdish alliance’ became widespread and was often preferred over ‘Kurdish-Arab brotherhood.’ On the other hand, after consolidating his influence and power, Mr. Nouri al-Maliki began to act arrogantly and recklessly, gambling with the fate of Iraq and its people. He tried to impose a fait accompli by force, operating according to a policy of acquisition and exploitation. He practiced a language of threats, intimidation, siege, starvation, pressure, maneuvering, flexing his muscles, and provoking the feelings of the Kurds and the regional government, especially during his second term in office. Even minor crises would escalate into full-blown conflagrations. The term ‘Shia-Kurdish alliance’ began to fade from the forefront, and the situation reached the point where the Kurds were being referred to by the group entrenched in the Green Zone as a burden on Iraq, the descendants of Yazid who slaughtered Hussein, the sons of Saladin who overthrew the Fatimid state in Egypt, and often, the children of jinn whom God has revealed.”

Maliki and the permanent solution:

Al Jazeera website reported on 2-8-2009 that the US administration informed Baghdad and Erbil of the need to find solutions to the outstanding problems between them before the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq in 2011, in accordance with the security agreement between them and the Iraqi government, stressing that it would only help to find such solutions and would not impose them on either side.

In order to resolve the recurring issue of consensus between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the federal government headed by Nouri al-Maliki, and to establish and broaden the Shiite-Kurdish alliance and regulate the dynamics of governance in Iraq, Maliki visited Erbil and met with Mr. Masoud Barzani, the then-President of the Region. The text of the agreement signed in Erbil on August 8, 2010, was written by Maliki himself. The agreement stated the following:

In accordance with the supreme national interest, and in order to expedite the formation of the government, the two parties commit to the following:

1- Commitment to and implementation of the constitution.

2- Adopting a roadmap for forming the new government as follows:

A- Mr. Jalal Talabani as President of the Republic.

B – Mr. Nouri al-Maliki as Prime Minister.

C – The position of Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be for the Iraqi woman and the position of Chairman of the National Council for Strategic Policies shall be for Dr. Iyad Allawi.

3- Both parties are working diligently to ensure the participation of all political blocs in the new government.

4- The Ministry of Defense, Interior, National Security and Intelligence shall be entrusted to independent experts agreed upon first by the two parties and then by the other parties.

5- Forming a supreme committee from the State of Law (Islamic Dawa Party) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, headed by Maliki and Barzani, and three from each side, whose task is to agree on all strategic issues and take unified positions regarding all outstanding issues between the federal government and the region. No party may take a strategic position except with their approval.

6- Implementing the necessary administrative reforms and adopting a unified stance regarding them (National Council for Strategic Policies, Cabinet System, Amendment of the Election Law, etc.)

7- Resolving outstanding issues with the region: (Article 140, arming, equipping and funding the regional guard, the oil law, water resources, etc.)…

But with the end of al-Maliki’s term, the situation between the two sides of the alliance was not in the required structure, and after the 2018 elections, the features of the political class in Iraq changed, as the Kurds lost the comprehensive alliance between them, and each party began to lead its political work with timid coordination between them. On the other hand, the Shiite forces lost unity in approach and political work and witnessed the rise of new forces that greatly affected the general direction of the Shiites in the philosophy of governance. This became clearly evident with the entry of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which are predominantly Shiite and were established as a result of the entry of terrorist gangs into Iraq and the occupation of some of its regions. It is a type of army similar to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, which maintains the pillars of Shiite rule in Iran.

By the end of al-Maliki’s second term, Iraq had lost a third of its territory to terrorists. He also decided to cut the Kurdistan Region’s share of the federal budget at the beginning of 2014, exposing the region to an economic crisis from which it still suffers. The Shiite-Kurdish alliance was in critical condition, with no medical staff available to treat it.

The rise of sectarian rhetoric against the Kurds:

The post-Maliki era witnessed a growing escalation of hostility towards the Kurds, particularly from the Shia, given the absence of Sunni political forces with a political orientation opposed to Shi’ism. Most Sunni politicians were co-opted, a situation mirrored by the Kurdish forces. We cite the example of Haider al-Abadi, who served as Prime Minister from 2014 to 2018. Following the end of the war against terrorist groups, he mobilized the armed forces to support the Peshmerga forces, who had stood alongside the Iraqi armed forces in combating terrorism. This effort, and the blood shed by both sides, led to the liberation of Iraqi territory. The term of Prime Minister al-Sudani ended with a Federal Court ruling prohibiting the Kurdistan Region from selling oil directly without the State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), and without compensating the companies operating in the region. The policy of withholding the budget from the region continued, and the focus was on the issue of paying the salaries and entitlements of the region’s employees from the federal Ministry of Finance, and even then, only intermittently. During this period, the prevailing slogan was that the Kurds should come under the umbrella of Shiite leadership, just as the Sunnis had. However, the Kurds are known for their stubbornness, which has made them pay a heavy price for not submitting to the policies of certain agendas that have begun to declare that the region’s experience is not a successful model and that there should be a return to the centralized system. This would certainly guarantee political and economic gains for the Shiites, but in return, the country and its main partner would be sacrificed.

The war raging in the region between the United States and its ally, the Zionist entity, on one side, and the Islamic Republic of Iran on the other, can be viewed as a new challenge to the Shiite-Kurdish alliance and, of course, to the Iraqi state and its institutions. The challenge lies in keeping Iraq safe from harm, given the presence of all the armed groups—which Muqtada al-Sadr described as uncontrolled weapons, or armed wings and factions, as the Iraqi government calls them—that will target the Kurdistan Region under the pretext of the presence of American institutions and citizens within it. This has created a rift in trust and national unity. This situation has led to an increase in sectarian rhetoric against the Kurdistan Region, particularly from the pro-Iranian forces that dominate the political and military landscape throughout Iraq. This tone has become very similar to how the Ba’athist regime described the Kurdish leadership, as we have seen calls to enter the region by using armed forces to force the region to submit completely and unconditionally to the policies of these political forces that claim to be hostile to the United States of America.

Summary:

Despite having a democratic and modern constitution that provides opportunities for everyone to engage in political work, after more than twenty years of Shiite rule, most of the articles of the constitution remain unimplemented, and Iraq has returned to square one to prove that it is a state of citizens and not a sectarian or nationalist state.

The Kurds were able to realize their dreams of a Kurdish region and enjoy all economic, security, and social privileges, but their concern was the status of Kirkuk, which remained suspended under Article (140) of the constitution, and after two decades became one of the signs of the collapse of the Shiite-Kurdish alliance. Therefore, it became clear to the Kurds that rights cannot be obtained through alliances, the constitution, and the law, but rather there must be continuous sacrifices. They must prepare for the worst-case scenarios and not rely on alliances and friends.

Although the Kurds do not pose a direct threat to the Shiites in governing Iraq, the Shiites could destroy everything related to the relationship with the Kurds, as they cannot afford to miss the golden opportunity to lead Iraq after everything was done for them by America. They will try everything to hold on to power because power is tempting.

shafaq.com