Local Elections in Iraq: The Disintegration of Alliances…and the Prospects for the Return of Muqtada al-Sadr

Local Elections in Iraq: The Disintegration of Alliances…and the Prospects for the Return of Muqtada al-Sadr

8-9-2023

The Iraqi government announced the holding of local elections (provincial councils) on December 18, 2023, after a 10-year hiatus since the date of the last local elections that Iraq witnessed in 2013, when the provincial councils were dissolved in compliance with the popular demands called for by the mass protest movement in October 2019 ( Tishreen movement), as a result of the failure of these councils to provide and secure the minimum living needs of the Iraqi citizen and the deterioration of the infrastructure in all governorates, in addition to their involvement in many aspects of financial and administrative corruption.

It is assumed that local elections will be held in all Iraqi governorates, except for the three governorates of the Kurdistan region – Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dohuk – which is subject to the self-rule system, and has an electoral system separate from the general electoral system implemented by the central government in Baghdad. It should be noted here that the decision to organize local elections came after Parliament approved the general budget of the state and the governorates, which prompted the political forces that control Parliament to return to work at the local level at a rapid pace, with the aim of taking care of their interests by controlling the political and financial authorities.

Local elections gain their importance in Iraqi political life because their results will determine the share of political parties and forces in the local councils, which play a broad role in legislation and oversight within the provinces, in addition to being not linked or subject to any ministerial body in its work, and in addition to that, it enjoys great administrative powers. In addition, the local elections in and of themselves are a strong indication of the nature of the interactions between the political forces that will run in the early parliamentary elections, which are likely to be held within a year from the date of Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani assuming the premiership in October 2022, according to what al-Sudani himself pledged.

The call for local elections, a decade after they stopped, increased political momentum regarding the nature of interactions between the existing political forces and parties, in addition to the developments in these interactions, whose features began to unfold with the developments taking place at the level of the Shiite coordination framework, which represents the forces. The most prominent political on the map of the political process in Iraq, and the disintegration of its alliances and the emergence of new alliances emanating from it. And also at the level of alliances of Sunni and Kurdish forces, in addition to some expectations that may indicate the possibility of the Sadrist movement returning to the political arena through the gate of local elections, which may reshape the overall map of interaction between the partisan forces, whether at the level of interaction between the Shiite political forces themselves, or Between it and other Sunni and Kurdish political forces, as well as the new civil forces.

A “tactical” disintegration of existing alliances
The results of the previous parliamentary elections – October 2021 – and the resulting political struggle between the Shiite political forces themselves; Dark shadows cast over the political process in Iraq, a struggle that ended with the formation of the losing forces in the elections – the forces of the coordination framework – the current Iraqi government headed by Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani, while the winning forces – the al-Sadr movement – tended to withdraw into themselves, withdraw from Parliament and voluntarily withdraw from political action. . After that, the framework forces were able, and through their control of Parliament in the absence of a balanced opposition, to amend the general election law, whether at the level of provincial elections, or at the level of parliamentary elections as a whole, in March 2023, and this amendment was summarized in the return to work of the “modified St. Lego” electoral system After it was repealed by Elections Law No. 9 of September 2020.

In this context, the map of political forces witnessed several developments, the most prominent of which occurred at the level of Shiite alliances within the coordination framework. As it seemed clear that the framework forces would not enter the local elections with a single electoral bloc, meaning that the Shiite forces affiliated with it would disintegrate into several alliances, each according to its political plan. It is expected that the Shiite religious parties will form a single alliance, as well as the leftist parties, while it is expected that the civil forces of moderation will tend to form a single alliance as well. This is in addition to the intra-disputes that affect the relations of the Shiite forces within the framework. Attempts to contain it by the leader of the “Fatah Alliance” Hadi al-Amiri and the leader of the Wisdom Movement, Ammar al-Hakim, failed; In order to maintain the unity of the frame. In addition, Nuri al-Maliki, the leader of the State of Law coalition, refused to participate in the Euphrates Movement, headed by Prime Minister Shia al-Sudani, in the upcoming local elections, although al-Sudani had the support of Nuri al-Maliki at some point.

Nuri al-Maliki wants to run in the local elections alone with his political bloc – the State of Law Coalition – on behalf of the rest of the forces of the coordination framework. That is, with a separate list, based on the results obtained by the coalition during the last parliamentary elections – October 2021 – in which it was ahead of all its peers from the Shiite political parties; Where he won 34 parliamentary seats, which means that al-Maliki is convinced that his popular base is stable, and has not changed, but he is expected to get more in the provincial elections.

What is remarkable about the transformations that occurred in the coordination framework was that it was linked to the escalation of the dispute with Prime Minister Shia’a al-Sudani, who took office with the help of the framework forces themselves, which prompted him to say that there is a clear change in the pattern of interactions of the main and influential forces within the framework whose main title is “the intersection of partisan interests.” At a political stage in which it is not yet clear where the country will go; Will you go to holding early parliamentary elections according to the Prime Minister’s wish, or will you go to postponement and completing the parliamentary term for a period of 4 years, according to the vision of the Coordinating Framework forces. There are clear interactions that indicate that some of the framework forces are criticizing the Sudanese policies on the one hand, in addition to the absence of the state of political coordination that characterized the course of the relationship between them over the past months on the other hand. Some explain this transformation by the fact that the Sudanese began to act as a statesman and not as a candidate for the forces of the framework, and therefore the feature of interaction based on equality and cooperation between the two sides was absent, and instead the feature of interaction based on predominance and control of matters was present on the part of the Sudanese in his capacity as head of government. The most prominent aspects of the disagreement that came out to the public was the sharp criticism directed by the Sudanese to a number of ministers affiliated with influential forces within the coordination framework, stating that the minister’s relationship with his political party ends at the threshold of his position; That is, when he obtains the confidence of Parliament, which some consider as an indication of the possibility of carrying out ministerial reshuffles that may lead to a state of muffled political clash between the Sudanese and the partisan forces to which some of the ministers who will be affected by the amendments belong, which means that the collective interest that brought the forces of the coordination framework together, It is no longer the same at the present time, but may differ from one issue to another and from one subject to another.

From this standpoint, the reasons for Nuri al-Maliki’s moves – head of the State of Law Coalition – to enter the local elections with a single list, away from his previous alliances with the Coordinating Framework forces, can be explained. However, this perception does not negate – as previously said – the return of the alliances again after the elections to share the “cake” of the provincial council positions, noting that the distribution of these important positions in the local councils will then be subject to the relative weights that the political forces will obtain in those elections, which means The “disintegration” of the coordination framework, although it is considered a clear indication of the existence of differences between its political forces, is at the same time considered a “tactical disintegration”, meaning that it will not completely affect the state of the “strategic alliance” of the framework.

Although the picture of the map of the political forces that will enter the local elections is not complete; Given the state of constant change in the interactions of these forces with each other, especially since the elections will be held at the end of the year, it can be said that the coordination framework as representative of all Shiite forces – with the exception of the Sadr movement – will be divided “electorally” into three currents:

1- The extreme right wing, represented by the traditional religious parties; Maliki’s coalition, represented by the State of Law coalition, Qais Khazali’s coalition, represented by Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Faleh al-Fayyad’s coalition, represented by the Shiite Mobilization Forces. Each of the three coalitions is heading to enter the local elections with a single list.

2- The Moderation Movement, represented by some Shiite religious forces as well, but they are more moderate than the previous movement, including the alliance of the Victory Movement of Haider al-Abadi, the former Prime Minister, and the Wisdom Movement of Ammar al-Hakim. During the past weeks, this alliance has tried to win over some forces and personalities known for their moderate approach from the rest of the Shiite forces, especially those who are reluctant to join either Maliki (the State of Law Coalition) or Khazali (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq). This current also intensifies its political consultations with the “Al-Wafaa Movement” and the “Iqtedar Watan” movement in an attempt to include them in its electoral lists.

3- The Shiite secular civil current, represented by some Iraqi left parties.

The same applies to Sunni alliances. Where the Sunni Sovereignty Alliance disintegrated when the Parliament Speaker Muhammad al-Halbousi’s “Takadum” party and Khamis Khanjar’s “Azm” coalition announced that they would enter the provincial elections with separate lists. With the aim of each party benefiting from the results of the elections in the provinces in which it enjoys a large popular base, similar to what al-Halbousi enjoys in Anbar Province, for example. However, at the same time, they did not deny the possibility of re-establishing their alliance when forming provincial councils. It is assumed that the Sunni political currents will enter the provincial elections with only two lists, as the division into multiple lists will lead to the dispersion of the votes of the Sunni component.

Likewise for the Kurdish political component; Although the three governorates of the region – Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dohuk – will not hold local elections; Given that the region, according to the state of autonomy that it enjoys, guarantees it an independent electoral system, the elections will include the disputed areas between the region and the central government of Baghdad. And here in particular, the interactions took an upward turn between the Kurdish political component; Because the regional government announced its total refusal to hold local elections in the disputed areas. Rather, the tone of escalation and treason returned among the Kurdish political forces themselves, as the Kurdistan Democratic Party believes that the “tacit approval” shown by the Kurdistan Union Party to the desire of the central government to include the electoral process in the disputed areas is tantamount to a “betrayal” of the foundations and pillars of Kurdish political action.

The position of the opposition civil forces
As for the civil opposition forces, which were formed on the impact of the popular movement in October 2019, they have intensified their political activity on the sidelines of preparing to enter the local elections. The period of the “year of political isolation” announced by the leader of the movement, Muqtada al-Sadr. That is, the opposition civil forces will try to fill the void left by al-Sadr’s withdrawal from political life, by wooing the popular bases that support him if the latter decides not to enter the provincial elections. It is expected that these forces will participate through an electoral coalition called the “Forces for Democratic Change” that was formed in June 2023, and includes: the “Nazil I Take My Right” movement, the “National Home Party” and the “Iraqi Communist Party”, along with a number of independent politicians. of the participants in Parliament.

The chances of these forces regarding achieving reliable results in the provincial elections are limited, and these results will not represent a marginal change in the Iraqi electoral map, especially if the al-Sadr movement decides to return to political action through the gate of local elections. In addition, its political programs rely only on opposition to the policies of traditional parties, without having clear political programs that include mechanisms of confrontation and the desired change. But at the same time, the bloc of these forces under slogans and programs of action rejecting sectarian quotas, as it is the basis of crises in Iraq, represents a “relative change” in the map of political actors on the one hand, and an opponent, albeit with a limited influence on the popularity of the major parties, on the other hand.

Possible return of the Sadr movement
The state of voluntary political isolation of the Sadr movement, which it announced on August 29, 2022 for a period of one year, is nearing completion, which may open the way for the movement again to return to political life, especially since the State Administration Coalition, which was formed from Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish forces, is under the influence of The political crisis related to the formation of the government Over the past year, he had pledged guarantees to end the work of the government – the government of Shia’a al-Sudani – a year and a half after the date of its formation in October 2022, and to call for early elections. This is exactly what Prime Minister Shia al-Sudani is trying to stick to achieving, but there are indications that the Shiite forces in the State Administration Coalition “may” be reneging on their promises in this regard, especially the hard-line forces that are pressing not to call for early elections, and instead resort to The survival of the Sudanese government for a full parliamentary term (4 years).

Regardless of these data, there are two possibilities regarding the participation of the Sadr movement in the provincial elections: The first is the movement’s tendency to actually participate in the local elections if they are held on the date set for them at the end of the current year 2023, which will coincide with the end of the period of political isolation that the movement imposed on itself. This requires “breaking” the state of voluntary isolation and returning to political action. As for the second possibility; It is the tendency to postpone the local elections until after March 2024, and here specifically the Sadrist movement will have regained, over a period of 8 months from the date of the end of its isolation, its strength in political action to its full potential. Therefore, the “insistence” of the coordination framework forces on holding local elections on time can be explained, which may limit the possibility of the Sadrist movement’s strong and effective participation in all governorates. Regardless of both possibilities, there are indications that the Sadrist movement may be determined to return to politics. Whether before or after the end of the period of isolation, as evidenced by the movement’s preparation of its election map in a number of governorates, and the preparation of the cadres that will contest it. Rather, there are those who believe that even if the Sadr movement did not participate in the local elections, the movements of its elements during the past months indicate a political role that it will actually play during those elections, including, for example, providing support to some forces, or by adopting a popular movement supporting anti-government forces. For the coordination framework and its components in the governorates. Noting that if the movement participates in this election, its expected results will necessarily affect the results of its political opponents, but it will not cause a “profound change” in the map of alliances of existing political forces. This change in results will be more evident in the governorates in which the Sadrist movement enjoys considerable popularity, namely the southern and central governorates.

On the other hand, there is an opinion that says that Al-Sadr’s decision to return to participate in the local elections may push the Coordinating Framework forces to rethink their tactics regarding entering the elections with separate lists. In this case, all the forces within the framework will have to re-consider the mechanism of the collective alliance between them, and enter into unified lists to confront the popularity enjoyed by the Sadrist movement, which is expected to be translated into the results of the local elections.

Finally, it can be said that the political scene in Iraq is on a date with new changes if it is decided to hold the local elections on the date set for them next December, and if the Sadrist movement decides to return to the arena of political action; Because the decision to participate in it means that the map of political interactions that existed over the past year will change its features and interaction equations.

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