Iraq between the “elite” deadlock and the “state’s” erosion: A reading of the post-April 2026 landscape
Iraq between the “elite” deadlock and the “state’s” erosion: A reading of the post-April 2026 landscape
2026-05-17 01:09
Dr. Gutiar Tamr
The question in Iraq is no longer: Who forms the government? Rather, it is: Is the state still capable of producing a government with genuine decision-making power? Since the November 2025 elections, the political deadlock has transcended mere procedural obstacles in the distribution of ministerial portfolios, reflecting a profound structural crisis within the very model of governance. Events have revealed that “consociational democracy,” initially presented as a formula for managing diversity, has gradually transformed into a mechanism for managing the power vacuum and paralyzing institutions, rather than a means of state-building.
The arrival of Nizar Amidi to the presidency, and the appointment of Ali al-Zaidi in April 2026, was not so much a victory for an integrated political program as it was a “necessary compromise” to avoid a wider collapse of the system in the face of increasing internal and external pressures. In this context, Iraq, with all its components and regions, appears to be stuck within a complex web of regional and international balances that limit the ability of any government to produce a fully independent decision.
The appointment of businessman Ali al-Zaidi represents more of a shift in the form of power than a fundamental change in its structure. Traditional forces are attempting to present an “economic face” capable of absorbing public anger and dealing with increasing international restrictions on the movement of capital. However, a crucial gap remains: Does the new government possess the actual authority to sever the economy’s ties to networks of partisan interests? Continued reliance on oil revenues to fund operational spending, particularly salaries, makes any reform project vulnerable to direct confrontation with the financial and political power structures that have formed over the past years. Furthermore, the parallel economy, linked to centers of power, weapons, and administrative influence, has become an additional burden on the very concept of the state. Therefore, the Iraqi crisis is no longer merely a governmental crisis, but a crisis of an economic and political model that has produced a broad class of beneficiaries who profit from the state’s perpetual fragility.
The stability of the “two-thirds quorum” that brought Nizar Amidi to the presidency reflects fragile political understandings between Baghdad and Erbil-Sulaymaniyah, especially with regard to the oil and gas files, salaries and administrative powers. However, these understandings remain hostage to the regional balance between Tehran and Washington, as each party tries to maintain its influence within the structure of the Iraqi system. In this context, the crisis in the relationship between the federal government and the region does not appear to be merely an administrative or financial dispute, but rather part of the crisis of the Iraqi state after 2003, where the concept of political partnership has remained subject to the logic of temporary settlements more than to a stable constitutional vision.
However, the continued weakness of the state threatens not only Baghdad, but also the overall political and social stability in Iraq and the region, including the relationship between its various components, in a country that is still searching for a balanced formula to manage its complex historical diversity.
The most serious dilemma facing the Al-Zaydi government remains the expansion of the “parallel state.” Weapons are no longer just a security force outside state institutions, but have gradually turned into a network of economic, administrative, and political interests capable of influencing public decision-making. Herein lies the real crisis, as any attempt to restrict weapons will clash with the fact that many political forces now view these weapons as a guarantee of continuity and influence within the system itself. Therefore, the current equation seems closer to “postponing the clash” than to a radical solution to the problem, which keeps the state suspended in a gray area between the rule of law and the logic of the status quo.
The Iraqi citizen, who is facing crises of services, unemployment, and declining trust in institutions, is no longer very concerned with speeches of political victory, as much as he is concerned with the existence of a state capable of providing the minimum level of stability and opportunities for life. The Iraqi who waits for long hours to get electricity, or who is looking for a job outside of the networks of party loyalty, no longer sees in the change of political faces a real guarantee of change unless this is reflected in his daily life in a tangible way.
Today, Iraq stands before a historic test that goes beyond the formation of governments and the distribution of positions. Either Ali al-Zaidi’s government succeeds in the gradual transition from the logic of power-sharing to the logic of administration and institutions, through real economic and political reforms and finding a radical solution with the region, or the slow erosion of the state’s prestige and society’s trust in it will continue.
Continuing the policy of “postponing crises” will only produce more complex blockages in the future, especially in light of escalating economic and social pressures and the decline in public confidence in the political process. However, the possibility of getting out of this predicament still exists, but it requires a political will that transcends narrow factional calculations towards redefining the idea of the state as a federal framework that unites all Iraqis. Today, Iraq is not only standing on the brink of a political crisis, but on the threshold of a historical test between a state that is slowly eroding and a society that has not yet lost its desire to survive.
shafaq.com
