From Shalamcheh to Khosravi: How did Iraqi prime ministers kill the “Al-Faw Port”?
From Shalamcheh to Khosravi: How did Iraqi prime ministers kill the “Al-Faw Port”?
2026-07-29
Shafaq News – Baghdad
On official maps, the Grand Faw Port appears to be Iraq’s gateway to the world, a starting point for a trade route intended to transport goods from the Gulf to Europe in about 20 days less than traditional routes. But on the ground, successive Iraqi governments have been drawing different lines.
While Baghdad is spending billions of dollars on building the port and the development road extending towards Turkey, it has simultaneously moved towards establishing railway lines linking Iraq to Iranian and Kuwaiti ports, allowing goods coming from neighboring countries to enter Iraqi territory without passing through the Faw port.
Thus, the project that Baghdad promoted as a cornerstone for transforming Iraq into a global transportation hub found itself besieged by competing corridors created by the Iraqi decisions themselves.
A line that begins with visitors and ends with goods
The story of the Grand Faw Port began in 2006, when the Iraqi government proposed a project to build a strategic port in the far south of the country. The vision was to build a deep-water port capable of receiving giant ships, and to link it to what later became known as the “Dry Canal,” a network of highways and railways extending from Basra to Turkey, with potential branches towards Syria and Europe.
The idea was simple in appearance but ambitious in its results, as ships coming from Asia and the Gulf would arrive at Faw, then transport their cargo overland through Iraq to Turkey and Europe, instead of continuing to sail through the Red Sea, the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean Sea.
In this way, Iraq aspired to restore its historical position as a corridor between East and West, and to obtain returns from handling, storage, transportation, insurance and logistics services.
However, the success of this plan required a fundamental condition, which was to protect the port of Faw from competing routes, and not to open lines that would give neighboring ports a direct route to Iraqi markets or the transport network leading to Turkey and Syria.
This condition was not met
In 2023, former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani laid the foundation stone for the railway link project between Basra and Iran via the Shalamcheh border crossing.
The government presented the project at the time as a line dedicated to transporting visitors and travelers, not goods, in an attempt to allay fears about its impact on the Faw port and Iraqi ports.
However, the engineering design details of the railway later raised questions about its true purpose.
It has been shown that the line’s carrying capacity, technically known as “axle load,” is up to 25 tons, specifications that are commonly used in heavy freight lines, while passenger lines typically have a carrying capacity of around 14 tons.
For critics of the project, these were not just geometric figures, but evidence that the line, which began under the title of transporting visitors, was designed from the beginning to accommodate freight trains as well.
A few days ago, the same scenario returned through another gateway.
During current Prime Minister Ali Faleh al-Zaidi’s visit to Tehran, the two sides signed an agreement to establish a new railway line through the Khosravi border crossing opposite Diyala province. Officials and members of parliament quickly spoke of using the line to transport both pilgrims and goods.
Thus, Iraq was left with two possible lines that would directly link its internal network to Iran, one in the far south near the port of Faw, and the other in the center via Diyala.
The project that was delayed by twenty years
Retired Major General Jamal Al-Halbousi, an expert in borders and international transport, believes that the railway link project via Shalamja was not the result of a purely Iraqi need, but rather came under the influence of political pressures.
He tells Shafaq News Agency that the project was initially presented as being dedicated to transporting visitors, before it evolved into a line capable of transporting goods, a transformation that puts it in direct competition with the commercial traffic that is supposed to pass through the port of Faw.
According to Al-Halbousi, the Shalamcheh and Khosravi lines could in the future allow for the transport of goods coming from Iranian ports, such as Bandar Abbas and Imam Khomeini Port, and perhaps from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, to Iraqi territory and from there towards Syria and the Levant countries.
In this case, ships would not need to reach Faw. They could unload their cargo at Iranian ports and then transport it by rail across the Iraqi border, utilizing the railway and road network funded by Baghdad.
Al-Halbousi says this path could turn into a “mercy bullet” for the Faw port if the project is not completed quickly and the government does not adopt policies that make Iraqi ports more competitive.
According to him, ports do not compete solely on geographical location. They also compete on handling and storage fees, the speed of customs procedures, the quality of logistics services, and the cost of inland transport.
If the cost of using Iraqi ports remains high, while ports in neighboring countries offer cheaper and faster services, international companies will choose the less expensive route, even if the Faw port is geographically closer to some markets.
Al-Halbousi believes that the Faw port and the development road together represent the true foundation for transforming Iraq into a regional center for transport and trade.
The development route is based on the construction of a modern railway line and a road extending from the port of Faw to the Turkish border, through a route of approximately 1,200 kilometers within Iraqi territory.
The road is planned to pass through the governorates of Basra, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Diwaniyah, Najaf, Karbala, Baghdad, Salah al-Din and Nineveh, before reaching Türkiye, and from there to European markets.
But the project, which was first proposed about twenty years ago, is still facing delays, amid administrative problems, accusations of corruption, and foot-dragging in contracts and implementation.
Experts say the problem is not just about the speed of completing the marine docks or digging the navigation channel, but about the absence of an integrated system linking the port to railways, roads, industrial zones, warehouses and border crossings.
A port without a modern transport network does not become a commercial center, but merely a container unloading station.
An old Iranian dream through Iraq
The idea of a railway link with Iran did not begin during al-Sudani’s era. It emerged clearly in 2014, during Haider al-Abadi’s government, when Tehran pushed for the establishment of a line linking Basra to the Iranian port of Imam Khomeini, and then extending through Iraq to the Syrian port of Latakia.
The project was part of a broader vision for a land and rail corridor linking Iranian ports to the Mediterranean Sea, utilizing Iraqi territory as the middle link in the route.
If this route is completed, goods arriving at Iranian ports can be transported through Iraq to Syria, without having to pass through Iraqi ports.
This means that Iraq may provide the land, railways, protection and infrastructure, while the maritime handling revenues go to the ports of another country.
In the south, Kuwait is also seeking to link the Iraqi railway network to the Mubarak Al-Kabeer port, a project that raises the same concerns.
If Basra becomes directly linked to Mubarak Port, goods can be unloaded in Kuwait and then enter Iraq by train, instead of going to Faw or Umm Qasr.
Thus, Iraq finds itself funding corridors that serve Iranian and Kuwaiti ports, while its largest port is still waiting for the completion of roads and lines that would give it economic viability.
International transport expert Ziad Al-Hashemi believes that any railway link with neighboring countries could affect the Faw port if it is not part of a comprehensive Iraqi strategy.
He tells Shafaq News Agency that shipping companies will choose the ports that offer them the best service and lowest cost, and if they find direct routes to transport goods from Iranian or Kuwaiti ports to Iraq, the need to unload ships at Iraqi ports may decrease.
He adds that this will weaken the volume of handling and reduce commercial activity associated with local ports, from storage to transportation, insurance and maritime services.
Al-Hashemi believes that the priority should be to establish direct shipping lines to Iraqi ports, and to connect Faw and Umm Qasr to the internal transport network, whether by rail or trucks.
But al-Hashemi also points out that turning the Iranian-Iraqi line into an international trade corridor is not a foregone conclusion, due to the weak connection of some Iranian ports to an effective and integrated railway network that reaches the Iraqi border.
This weakness may give Iraq extra time, but it does not eliminate the long-term danger, especially if Iran completes its internal projects and connects its ports to the Shalamcheh and Khosravi border crossings.
As for the connection with Kuwait, Al-Hashemi believes that it could attract a portion of maritime shipments to Mubarak Port, especially if Kuwaiti ports become a hub for redistributing goods to Iraq and the region.
He emphasizes that the study of any new line should not be limited to the cost of its construction or its bilateral benefits, but should include its impact on the strategic location of the Faw port and other Iraqi ports.
Port before the railways
Former Iraqi Transport Minister Salam al-Maliki sums up the dilemma by saying that “no railway line or road has strategic value unless it is based on a global hub port.”
Al-Maliki believes that the Faw port represents a “national entitlement” from which any Iraqi vision for regional transport networks should begin, and not come at the end of the list of projects.
He warns that delaying the completion of the port will increase the pressure on the Umm Qasr port, which does not have the capacity to accommodate Iraq’s economic ambitions or the volume of trade expected via the development route.
According to al-Maliki, continued reliance on Umm Qasr, with the opening of direct lines to the ports of neighboring countries, could turn Iraq into merely a transit corridor for goods, without it obtaining the real economic value resulting from shipping, unloading, storage and manufacturing operations.
There is a big difference between a country through which trains pass and a country that controls the entire transport chain.
The first receives limited transit fees, while the second manages ports, warehouses, industrial zones, transport companies, insurance and financial services.
Al-Maliki says the goal should be to transform Iraq into an “integrated commercial and logistical hub,” not a transit point for goods from other countries.
For her part, the head of the parliamentary transport and communications committee, Zahra al-Bajari, presents a different account regarding the Shalamja line.
She tells Shafaq News Agency that the project was designed primarily to support land transport and facilitate the movement of travelers, and that the funding for the Iraqi part of it came from the Ministry of Transport’s budget, while Iran took over the construction of the bridge and the removal of war remnants on the side related to the project.
She explains that the delay in implementation is due to the Spanish company contracted for the project, stressing that the contract with them has not yet been terminated.
But these details raise a bigger question about who will benefit economically from the line when it is completed.
Iraq finances the railway located within its territory and prepares it to receive trains with heavy loads, while Iran has ready ports that can send its goods via this route.
While Iraqi governments continue to assert that linking with neighboring countries will boost trade and regional integration, critics say that integration is not balanced when one country owns the port and the other owns only the land through which goods pass.
For two decades, Iraqi prime ministers have spoken of the Faw as a project that will transform the country’s position on the global trade map. Yet, those same governments signed agreements that could allow neighboring ports to use Iraq as a transit route for their goods, creating a paradox within Iraq’s larger project.
shafaq.com
