Between transgression and obstruction: Iraq’s constitution faces amendment.

Between transgression and obstruction: Iraq’s constitution faces amendment.

2026-10-23

Shafaq News – Baghdad
Legal experts, analysts, and politicians agree that the stagnation of the Iraqi constitution issued in 2005 and its complex procedural conditions stand as an obstacle to resolving constitutional amendments and overcoming the recurring political deadlock, amid a heated division over the priority of amending the problematic texts or the commitment of the influential forces to implement the existing and suspended provisions.

The constitutional amendment crisis was renewed following an explicit call made by the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, Judge Faiq Zaidan, last Thursday, in which he demanded a review of constitutional provisions and an update of legislation to address the recurring problems that have disrupted national entitlements, most notably the mechanisms for forming governments and determining the “largest parliamentary bloc”.

Constitutional deadlock obstacle

The first obstacle to changing the rules of the political game lies in the jurisprudential structure of the constitution itself. Legal researcher Ali Al-Tamimi explains that the Iraqi constitution is classified among rigid constitutions that are not subject to amendment by a simple majority, but rather through a specific procedural path defined by Articles (126) and (142).

Al-Tamimi confirms to Shafaq News Agency that the decision of the Supreme Federal Court No. (54/Federal/2017) made Article (142) the mandatory entry point for any amendment.

He explains that “the legislative path has only one way forward, which begins with reviving the 2009 report of the Parliamentary Amendments Committee — which included amending 50 articles and was frozen by a political decision — and passing it with an absolute majority of the deputies, before submitting it to a public referendum, provided that it is not rejected by two-thirds of the voters in 3 governorates.”

Al-Tamimi emphasizes that this last condition (the veto of the governorates) makes the Iraqi amendment one of the most difficult constitutional amendments in the world.

For his part, researcher and academic Alaa Najah points out that “Articles 126 and 142 make any attempt to change the texts closer to a conflict of interests between political entities, especially when dealing with the powers of the regions, natural and oil resources, and determining the identity of the disputed areas, foremost among them Kirkuk.”

Najah adds to Shafaq News Agency that reform requires adopting gradual and monitorable paths that ensure transparency, respond to Iraq’s international human rights obligations, and guarantee the independence of the judiciary.

The dialectic of the system and the bloc

Regarding the joints of government, the Federal Court’s 2010 interpretation of Article (76) sparked controversy that lasted for years. In this regard, Essam Al-Faily, a professor of political science at Al-Mustansiriya University, believes that “the judicial interpretation of 2010 distorted the concept of (the largest bloc) from the list that won the elections to the bloc that is formed after it within parliament, which reinforced the hegemony of one component and made the political process revolve in a vicious cycle.”

Al-Faily adds to Shafaq News Agency that the political system needs an amendment that allows the parliamentary forces to be divided into a ruling majority and an opposition, as proposed by the leader of the Shiite National Movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, to address the condition of a two-thirds vote in parliament to elect the president of the republic, which created something similar to the “blocking third” in Lebanon.

He believes that the ambition to change the form of the system is hampered by a lack of trust and the desire of some parties to insert temporary clauses that have affected the course of consensus.

In the context of searching for alternatives to overcome the quota system, Ali Al-Tamimi points out that experience has proven the inadequacy of the parliamentary system in its current form.

He calls for the adoption of the mixed system (on the French model) as a more realistic option, where the President of the Republic is elected directly by the people with broad powers (amending Article 73), while the Prime Minister appointed by Parliament manages the government, in addition to the need to address Article (140) relating to the disputed areas, whose deadline expired in 2007.

In the same vein, political analyst Sabah Al-Akeeli believes that the exceptional circumstances that accompanied the drafting of the constitution in 2005 under the umbrella of the American occupation left many gaps and voids.

Al-Akeeli, speaking to Shafaq News Agency, points out that “the parliamentary committee that was formed under pressure from the October 2019 movement put forward proposals to move towards a semi-presidential system.”

But Al-Akeeli links the success of any step to the availability of a comprehensive consensus, stressing that “amendment is an inevitable requirement to keep pace with international changes and experiences, but it always clashes with the condition of parliamentary and popular consensus.”

The app before modification

On the other hand, a contrasting position emerges that views the feasibility of these calls at the present time with skepticism, as Erbil-based political analyst Mohammed Zangana believes that the problem does not lie in the wording of the constitutional text, but rather in Baghdad and the influential forces’ refusal to implement it and their selective approach to dealing with it.

Zangana reveals to Shafaq News Agency that there are “more than 55 constitutional articles that are suspended or violated, most notably Article 140 and the federal laws regulating the federal structure, most notably the Oil and Gas Law and the Federal Council Law (Article 65).”

In conclusion, raising this issue from time to time is considered merely a “political bubble” to occupy the public, stressing that the multi-component diversity and lack of consensus prevent agreement on a unified mechanism for amendment, and that what is required first is a decision from the Federal Court that determines the extent of the clauses actually applied, with the availability of a real political will to implement before embarking on any path to amend the constitutional text.

shafaq.com