Between the “Sudanese concession” and the ambiguity of the framework’s position… are the political forces heading towards a decisive resolution or a compromise?
Between the “Sudanese concession” and the ambiguity of the framework’s position… are the political forces heading towards a decisive resolution or a compromise?
1-13-2026
The formation of the new government, particularly the prime ministership, remains shrouded in political ambiguity, amidst conflicting statements and differing interpretations within the Coordination Committee and other political forces, despite the constitutional deadlines nearing their crucial stages.
In recent days, talk has intensified about Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani stepping down in favor of Nouri al-Maliki, leader of the State of Law Coalition. This speculation is based on statements from some leaders, including Qusay Mahbouba, a leader in the Reconstruction and Development Coalition, who asserted that al-Sudani conceded willingly and unconditionally. Mahbouba claimed the aim was to prevent the selection of a compromise candidate, which many view as a recipe for a weak and unstable government.
However, the Coordination Committee has yet to issue any clear official statement confirming or denying this concession, raising serious questions: Is this a genuine decision within the Committee? Or merely political posturing and pressure to realign positions? Or does the situation remain open to other scenarios?
In an interview with Al-Maalomah, Jassim Mohammed Jaafar, a leader in the State of Law Coalition, warned that pursuing this option could complicate the political landscape rather than resolve it, emphasizing that compromises are often temporary and lay the groundwork for new crises later on.
He pointed out that Sudani made concessions after sensing reservations or rejection from some members of the coalition regarding his continued participation, reflecting the extent of pressure within the Shia political establishment.
Conversely, another perspective suggests that the coalition has not yet made a final decision, and that the issue of Maliki and Sudani remains part of an internal power struggle, awaiting the clarification of the final alliances, both within the coalition itself and with Kurdish and Sunni forces, particularly concerning the presidency.
Ahmed Al-Harki, a member of the Union, told Al-Maalomah that the ongoing dialogues are showing positive signs for expediting government formation, stressing the need to adhere to constitutional deadlines and prioritize the national interest. He noted that the country is currently in a phase of crisis resolution following the elections.
Here are three main scenarios for the upcoming scene:
The first scenario: The framework has effectively decided in favor of Maliki, with the formal confirmation of Sudani’s concession, and then proceeding to complete understandings with the Kurds and Sunnis to form the government within the constitutional deadlines.
The second scenario: The framework fails to reach a final agreement, and everyone returns to the option of a compromise candidate, which is something that parties within the framework warn against and see as an entry point to a weak and threatened government from its first day.
The third: continued procrastination and ambiguity, which may lead to exceeding constitutional deadlines and entering into an open political crisis, or imposing an immature settlement under the pressure of time and balances.
So far, it cannot be definitively stated that the Sudanese concession has become a final political reality. Rather, it appears to be a pressure tactic and a maneuver within the framework, pending the official announcement of the position. However, what is certain is that the next few days will be decisive: either a clear internal resolution, a slide towards a complex settlement, or the opening of the door to a new crisis whose extent no one can predict.
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