Al-Zaydi’s “incomplete” government clashes with the equation of ruling under the influence of weapons.
Al-Zaydi’s “incomplete” government clashes with the equation of ruling under the influence of weapons.
2026-05-15
Shafaq News – Washington/Baghdad
The government of the new Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi entered the political scene through the gateway of incomplete parliamentary confidence, after the House of Representatives granted confidence to only 14 ministers, while nine sovereign and service portfolios remained pending, most notably the Interior, Defense and Planning ministries.
This postponement was not interpreted as a technical procedure or a simple dispute over the distribution of positions, but rather as an indication of deeper complexities related to redrawing the balances within the Iraqi political system, especially with regard to the position of armed factions and the future of their influence within the state.
This comes at a sensitive regional and international moment, in which American pressure on Baghdad is increasing, coinciding with internal transformations that are witnessing escalating competition between the forces of the coordination framework, and attempts to produce a governing formula capable of absorbing external pressures without blowing up internal balances.
Early political messages
From the first session to grant confidence, it was clear that the new government was not fully decided, as the postponed portfolios are not marginal ministries, but rather represent the joints of security, administrative and economic decision-making, reflecting the continued disagreements between the political forces regarding their management.
The Ministries of Interior and Defense are of exceptional importance because they are directly linked to the issue of weapons and armed factions, which is the most sensitive issue in the relationship between Baghdad and Washington, as well as in the balance of power within the Shiite bloc itself.
According to political data, the distribution of ministries was done according to precise balances between the components, where the Kurds got the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Environment, while the Sunnis got five portfolios, while the Coordination Framework retained important economic and service ministries, including oil, finance and electricity. However, this distribution did not end the disputes, but rather postponed some of them to later rounds of negotiations.
Factions and the equation of governance
The most prominent transformation in the Iraqi scene after 2003 was the shift of armed factions from their security and military role to the position of an influential political partner in decision-making. These groups, which strengthened their influence during the war against ISIS, now possess a political, parliamentary and economic presence that is difficult to ignore.
In this context, political researcher Ramadan Al-Badran told Shafaq News Agency that the issue of factions in Iraq begins as an internal crisis, but at the same time it is an extension of a broader regional and international crisis, explaining that the connection of these groups to Iran makes them part of the network of tension between Tehran and Washington.
He adds that the factions are no longer just an external extension, but have come to have a direct influence on the decisions of the state and governments, considering that the political system after 2003, especially during Nouri al-Maliki’s two governments between 2006 and 2014, practically established the legitimacy of the existence of these groups as a defensive force for the political system.
Al-Badran raises questions that reflect the essence of the current problem: Why were parallel formations to the army created? And why are they now being asked to withdraw after years of participating in protecting the regime?
While Iran considers these factions to have contributed to protecting the state, Washington sees them as a departure from the principle of the state’s monopoly on weapons.
Framework and Balance Management
Observers believe that the selection of Ali al-Zaidi was not so much a result of political superiority within the coordination framework, but rather an expression of the need for a consensus figure capable of managing the complex balances between its parties.
In this context, Haitham Al-Hiti, a professor of political science at the University of Exeter in Britain, told Shafaq News Agency that Al-Zaidi is a point of consensus within the coordination framework, which makes him closer to a conciliatory rather than a confrontational figure.
It is noted that the forces within the framework have acquired similar influence that prevents the dominance of one party, therefore a figure who “can be managed politically,” as he described it, was chosen.
Al-Hiti believes that the option of direct confrontation with the factions seems unlikely at the present stage, suggesting a move towards “legal framing” of these groups within state institutions, as a middle ground solution that balances between American pressures and the internal political reality.
This proposal reflects a growing trend within some circles of power that is based on integrating armed influence within legal and administrative frameworks, rather than attempting to dismantle it directly, which could lead to a broad internal clash.
Deferred understandings
Although the government is constitutionally complete, many indicators suggest that it is not yet politically complete. The widespread postponement of appointments to key ministerial posts reflects the existence of understandings that have not yet been finalized or perhaps even announced.
In this context, political researcher Imad Al-Musafir, who is close to the coordination framework, told Shafaq News Agency that the formation of Iraqi governments since 2005 is based on declared and undeclared understandings that change according to the stage and regional balances.
He adds that postponing some ministries until after the Eid al-Adha holiday “may be part of a larger political agreement that has not yet been announced,” noting that the demands of some forces, including the Sadiqun Alliance, will be addressed gradually through subsequent rounds of negotiations.
This conversation reveals that the new government is still in the process of rebuilding internal alliances, and that parliamentary confidence was only the first step in an ongoing negotiation process.
Pressure and maneuver
In parallel with the internal scene, the al-Zaidi government faces a highly sensitive external test, as the United States has intensified its pressure on Baghdad in recent months through sanctions targeting figures linked to armed factions, along with repeated statements confirming that the state’s monopoly on weapons is a fundamental condition for developing bilateral relations.
Iraqi political sources also speak of an “undeclared” American veto on the participation of some armed factions in the government, while the US State Department confirmed that its dealings with the new government “will be based on actions, not words.”
This situation puts Baghdad in front of a difficult equation: on the one hand, the government needs to maintain the cohesion of its internal alliances, and on the other hand, it cannot ignore American pressures related to economic and security support and international relations.
It appears that the Al-Zaidi government is trying, in its first phase, to buy time by postponing a decision on the most sensitive issues, while waiting for the outlines of regional and international understandings to become clear.
The troubled birth of Ali al-Zaidi’s government reveals that Iraq is still experiencing a structural crisis that goes beyond simply forming governments or distributing positions. The real conflict revolves around the form of the state itself, the limits of the influence of armed factions, and the nature of the relationship between Baghdad and influential regional and international powers.
Between Washington’s pressures, Tehran’s calculations, and the balances of the coordination framework, the new prime minister finds himself facing a complex test: either to produce a new political settlement that reorganizes the relationship between the state and the factions, or to enter a new phase of postponed political deadlock.
With the sovereign ministries still being postponed, the current Iraqi government appears more like a government under negotiation than a stable authority that has made its final choices.
shafaq.com
