Al-Zaidi is on the verge of becoming Prime Minister… Will he lead Iraq to stability or reproduce the crises?
Al-Zaidi is on the verge of becoming Prime Minister… Will he lead Iraq to stability or reproduce the crises?
2026-04-28
Amid the rapid political transformations in Iraq, the name of Ali Faleh Kazem al-Zaidi stands out as one of the most controversial and questionable figures, not only because of his sudden rise to the forefront of the scene, but also because of the nature of his background, which differs from the traditional pattern of men of power in the country.
According to recent Reuters reports, al-Zaidi is a prominent businessman with a wide network of interests in the financial and commercial sectors, placing him among the influential economic players who operate outside the traditional political sphere. Information indicates that his activities extend to vital areas, including banking and supply chains, as well as his involvement with the food rationing system, one of the most sensitive economic and social issues in Iraq.
Reports add that al-Zaidi was described as a “millionaire in his forties,” a description that reflects not only his financial status but also his age within a relatively young leadership group compared to many traditional political figures. At the same time, the same sources confirm that he was not a widely known political figure before his name was put forward, further reinforcing the image of him as a “newcomer” to the political arena.
This combination of economic weight and previous political absence explains, according to widely circulated media descriptions, his classification as a “technocratic” or economic candidate rather than a traditional politician who rose through the ranks of established parties or via conventional ideological paths. Thus, his rise not only reflects a political compromise but also points to a shift in the nature of the options available within the Iraqi political system, where capital and economic expertise are sometimes called upon to bridge the gaps and complexities of politics.
In moments of major political transformation, events are not interpreted in isolation from history, but rather analyzed through recurring and similar patterns, even if names and faces change. In Iraq specifically, three elements intersect, prompting reflection: name, age, and the method of attaining power. With the emergence of Ali Falih Kadhim al-Zaidi as a compromise candidate for prime minister, the old question resurfaces in a new guise: Are we witnessing a repetition of a historical pattern, or the beginning of a different path?
Ali in Iraqi political memory: A justice in crisis
Since the time of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the name “Ali” has been associated in the Iraqi and Arab imagination with connotations of justice and moral legitimacy. He ruled from Kufa during one of the most sensitive periods in Islamic history, where he sought to establish the principles of justice and equality, but he faced, in contrast, a sharp political division that ended in bloody conflicts.
This historical paradox – justice on one hand, and crisis on the other – continued to haunt the name symbolically, even if it did not have a direct impact on everyone who bore it later.
Throughout history, the name “Ali” appears in a limited but notable way in positions of government or senior administration in Iraq:
Ali ibn Abi Talib ruled from Kufa (656–661 AD). He represents the highest historical model of political authority in early Iraq. His rule was associated with the idea of “justice in a time of division.”
Ali Rida al-Rikabi assumed the premiership of Iraq in the early days of the modern state, representing the establishment of the political administration after the Ottoman era. He was among the first statesmen of the monarchy.
Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi served as Prime Minister several times during the monarchy. He played an important administrative role in running the state between 1930 and 1940. He represented the model of an “administrative statesman” more than a confrontational political leader.
Rulers in their forties: The ambition for change and the intensity of the clash
In modern Iraq, tracking the ages of rulers when they came to power reveals a striking pattern. A number of the leaders who ruled the country were in their early forties, a stage characterized by political vitality and high ambition, but which may also be associated with drastic decisions.
Abdul Karim Qasim (44 years old) came to power through the 1958 revolution, and achieved remarkable social reforms, but he entered into internal conflicts that ended in a bloody end.
Abdul Salam Arif (42 years old) came to power through a coup, and his term was marked by upheavals and instability.
Saddam Hussein (42 years old) began his rule with political and popular purges, whether at the level of individuals or parties that posed a threat to his future as President of Iraq, before the country slipped into long wars, injustice to the people, a siege that destroyed the military and economic infrastructure, and international and regional isolation.
The result imposed by this historical path is almost always the same: strong beginnings driven by the energy of change, endings often burdened by conflicts, and bloody coups that leave the fate of the people and the nation hostage to creative chaos.
Ali al-Zaydi: A compromise candidate outside the traditional mold?
In this context, Ali Falih Kadhim al-Zaidi stands out as a relatively different case. He does not come from a military background, nor is he known as the leader of a traditional mass party, but is presented as a figure with an economic and administrative background.
His arrival came as a result of an agreement within the coordination framework, after the failure of the heavyweight names, which makes him closer to a “compromise candidate” than to a “confrontational project leader.”
These facts place him outside the classic pattern of rulers of the 1940s in Iraq, who often rose to power through coups or revolutions.
Between repetition and breaking the rule
The fundamental question here is not so much about the Zaidi person as it is about the structure that surrounds him:
If he succumbs to the pressures of political balances, he may turn into a crisis manager rather than a decision-maker.
If he succeeds in utilizing his economic background, he could become a turning point towards rational administrative governance.
The paradox is that the factors that might weaken him (being a compromise candidate) are the same factors that might give him a chance to succeed, if he can turn consensus into stability.
Iraq’s future: Two open scenarios
The first (positive) scenario: A government that focuses on the economy and services, and succeeds in managing internal balances, leading to relative stability and an improvement in regional relations.
The second (negative) scenario: The Prime Minister becomes a front for power struggles, with paralysis in political decision-making and the continuation of chronic crises.
The people are caught between hope and caution.
The decisive factor remains the impact of this equation on the Iraqi citizen. If the consensus model succeeds, Iraqis may witness a gradual improvement in services and the economy. However, if it fails, reality will remain trapped in the same cycle: recurring crises, eroding trust, and corruption that eats away at state institutions and the harsh realities of a people already deeply wounded by the past, suffering from all these political infighting.
In conclusion, corruption cannot be reduced to mere individual transgressions or administrative errors. Rather, according to this perspective, it is a structural phenomenon that arises when the value system weakens and the balance of responsibility within the state and society is disrupted. When interests become intertwined and accountability is absent, corruption transforms into a persistent environment that generates further dysfunction within governing institutions.
The analysis confirms that the continuation of this cycle leads to the weakening of the state and a decline in the citizen’s confidence in its institutions, while genuine reform remains contingent on a political and moral will that redefines power as a responsibility, not a prize, and restores the law as the supreme authority.
Open question
Will Ali Faleh Kazem al-Zaidi be an extension of the pattern of rulers of the 1940s in Iraq, where ambition leads to conflict? Or will he break this rule and present a new model of consensual rule that redefines Iraq’s political and economic position in the region?
The answer, as is customary in Iraq, will not come quickly… but it will determine the shape of the entire next phase.
shafaq.com
