The Baghdad cliff reveals the dilemma: disarming the factions is impossible on the ground.
The Baghdad cliff reveals the dilemma: disarming the factions is impossible on the ground.
2026-08-02
Shafaq News – Special Translation
On July 24, Iraqi forces arrived at the gates of the headquarters of the Special Missions Regiment of the Al-Nujaba Movement in the Jurf al-Nadaf area of Baghdad to carry out a search operation for drones and missiles, but they were unable to enter the compound after leaders in the movement objected to the operation and refused to allow the government force to carry out its mission.
A report by the US-based Al-Monitor website quoted Iraqi security officials as saying that leaders loyal to the movement warned the officers against entering the facility, before armed fighters affiliated with Al-Nujaba surrounded the government force and fired warning shots into the air above their vehicles.
The operation ended without the inspection being carried out, after the forces were ordered to withdraw. The Baghdad Operations Command, the Federal Police, and the Popular Mobilization Forces Security Directorate participated in the operation. However, the Popular Mobilization Forces command informed its members that it was unaware the operation targeted a facility belonging to the al-Nujaba Movement, before army units received similar orders to withdraw.
Despite the incident being limited in scope and the absence of injuries or clashes, its timing gave it significant political and security importance, as it was considered, according to the report translated by Shafaq News Agency, the first practical test of Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s pledge to put all weapons under state control by September 30, the date set for the end of the US-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq.
An early test of the promises of disarmament
According to the American report, the incident in Jurf al-Nadaf reveals the extent of the gap between government pledges regarding restricting weapons to the state and Baghdad’s actual ability to enforce its decisions within the areas and facilities controlled by armed factions.
The Zaidi government is trying to proceed on a delicate path based on strengthening state authority and limiting the independent military capabilities of the factions, without slipping into an internal confrontation that may be difficult to contain or control the consequences of.
Unlike previous confrontations, the incident of Jurf al-Naddaf took place away from public statements and media escalation, and no detailed official statements were issued about it, before information about it later emerged through security sources.
According to the report, this secrecy reflects the keenness of both sides to avoid a situation that would lead to a direct confrontation before September 30, as the government does not want to turn the disarmament file into an armed clash, while the factions do not want to appear as the party that openly challenges the state.
Haider Shakri, a researcher in the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, said that the outcome was not much different from previous confrontations, but the way it was dealt with had changed.
He explained that Baghdad has become inclined to use less confrontational tools, through restructuring the security sector and exerting indirect pressure on funding and logistical support networks and leaders associated with the factions, instead of relying on public warnings or direct military confrontations.
However, the report argued that the success of this strategy is not measured by the results of individual security operations, but rather by the state’s ability to reduce the political and institutional cover that protects armed groups and gives them ample room to maneuver.
By this standard, the Al-Naddaf bulldozing operation represented a test that the government failed to pass, as the forces withdrew without carrying out their mission, and no arrests or announced legal proceedings were recorded against the elements that prevented the inspection and forced the government force to retreat.
Al-Shakri said that the government’s inability to implement its decisions against one of the “resistance” factions, or its failure to pursue the incident legally and politically, indicates that armed groups still possess an actual ability to disrupt some of the state’s procedures.
He added that the failure to take public action after the incident could send messages to other factions regarding the limits of Baghdad’s willingness to proceed with weapons control measures.
The report indicated that armed factions do not deal with the disarmament issue in the same way, as some groups, such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, have become more involved in political and economic work, which may reduce their willingness to enter into a direct confrontation with the state.
In contrast, other factions, including Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, still refuse to place their arsenals under the full control of the state, and cling to their military presence as part of their ideological and regional role.
In this regard, Iraqi political analyst Muhannad Al-Ghazi said that some factions link their weapons to an ideological framework that makes giving them up almost impossible from their point of view.
Al-Ghazi warned against confusing limited, headline-grabbing seizures with actual disarmament, likening it to pursuing vehicles used in attacks while leaving their manufacturing sites and sources of equipment unaddressed.
The report noted that a number of camps, drone manufacturing workshops, and weapons storage sites are located within areas where factions have broad influence, making the issue as much political and institutional as it is security-related.
external pressures
The pressures are not limited to the internal front, as Baghdad also faces increasing regional demands to prevent the use of Iraqi territory to launch attacks against neighboring countries.
The Saudi Ministry of Defense announced earlier that its air defenses shot down drones launched from Iraqi territory towards oil facilities in the Eastern Province and the capital, Riyadh, accusing Iranian-backed armed groups of being behind the attacks.
Saudi Arabia affirmed its right to respond at the appropriate time and place.
Then, US-Saudi airstrikes targeted sites belonging to armed factions in eastern Iraq, killing at least 20 people, according to the report.
Saudi Arabia said the strikes targeted an Iranian-backed group it accuses of carrying out attacks against oil facilities in the Eastern Province and around Riyadh.
The security developments led to the postponement of a visit that al-Zaidi was scheduled to make to Saudi Arabia.
The Monitor report stated that the repeated attacks from Iraqi territory, whether carried out directly or through groups operating with Iranian support, put the government to the test regarding its ability to protect sovereignty and prevent Iraq from becoming an arena for settling regional conflicts.
According to the report, setting September 30 as the date for the complete disarmament process does not seem realistic, given that the factions continue to maintain independent military capabilities and broad political and institutional influence.
A government that was unable to inspect a facility belonging to the al-Nujaba movement after its forces were threatened will face even greater difficulty in dismantling groups that possess missiles, drones, funding networks, camps, and military production sites.
According to estimates, the government may be able to implement limited measures in the coming period, such as transferring some weapons, closing a number of sites, or reorganizing some formations, without reaching a complete dismantling of military arsenals.
Al-Shakri said that these measures may provide political momentum for the government, but they will not mean dismantling the military capabilities of the factions, especially as the stronger groups continue to possess political influence, institutional protection, and independent capabilities.
The report noted that genuine disarmament requires dismantling armed organizations, controlling weapons production and storage sites, and ending the associated financing and leadership networks.
However, implementing these steps could lead to a widespread internal confrontation, and could prompt Iran to intervene to protect its allies, making the government inclined to take a gradual approach rather than a direct confrontation.
The potential strategy is based on absorbing the factions most willing to cooperate within state institutions, and exerting political and financial pressure on the dissenting groups, while trying to reduce their influence in areas such as Tarmiya north of Baghdad, and Jurf al-Sakhr south of the capital.
But the success of this path remains linked to factors beyond Baghdad’s capabilities, foremost among them the nature of relations between the United States and Iran, and the extent to which regional tension continues.
In light of these facts, the report indicated that measuring the government’s success by achieving complete disarmament within a short period may not be realistic.
It proposes a more limited criterion, namely Baghdad’s ability to reduce the factions’ capabilities to carry out attacks, transfer weapons, threaten neighboring countries, and operate outside the official command structure.
Despite the institutional steps taken by the al-Zaydi government to reorganize the security services and strengthen state authority, the Jurf al-Nadaf incident revealed the continued existence of areas where it is difficult for government forces to enforce their decisions.
It also showed that the disarmament file is not about issuing orders or carrying out individual inspections, but is related to dismantling an intertwined political, economic and security system through which the factions have influence inside and outside state institutions.
As September 30th approaches, the government faces a test that goes beyond the issue of collecting weapons, to its ability to enforce its decisions without slipping into internal conflict, and to transform the restriction of weapons from a political pledge into an implementable reality.
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