US warns Iran of fate of ‘invading Iraq': Learn from Saddam’s mistakes

US warns Iran of fate of ‘invading Iraq': Learn from Saddam’s mistakes

2024-10-27 04:17

Shafaq News/ The American “Carnegie Endowment” called on Iran to learn from the “grave mistake” made by the Iraqi regime’s president, Saddam Hussein, during the nineties in the escalation when he stopped his cooperation with international inspectors and exacerbated doubts about his weapons programs.

After the American Institute mentioned in a report translated by Shafaq News Agency, the exchange of military confrontations between Iran and Israel, it pointed out the possibility that Iran will resort to more radical options to reset regional dynamics, including adhering to its repeated threats to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and reducing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The American report explained that Article 10 of this international treaty allows the state to withdraw, but requires it to provide a notice 3 months in advance and explain the “extraordinary events” that have endangered its “supreme national interests.”

According to the report, Iran could cite Israel’s refusal to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, its military actions in the region, including against Iranian targets, and ongoing international pressure on it as justifications for withdrawing from the treaty.

According to the report, withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty does not necessarily mean that Iran has decided to move to acquire nuclear weapons, but the move is likely to raise and magnify speculation, adding that although Tehran has long stressed that it does not seek to possess nuclear weapons, it can build them relatively quickly if it chooses to do so.

The report noted that since the Trump administration withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018, Iran has continued to develop its nuclear capabilities and backed away from its broad monitoring obligations under the agreement, weakening the international community’s ability to quickly detect potential nuclear weapons moves.

The report found that the most obvious reason that might prompt any country to end the supervision role carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency is to hide its capabilities to manufacture a nuclear bomb, but it added that reducing transparency on this subject might serve as a means of pressure that allows the country to bargain in order to achieve the easing of sanctions.

The Carnegie Endowment report indicated that political decision-makers in Tehran may consider that raising ambiguity about their nuclear program would increase the seriousness of the threats they are launching at a time when their regional position is in danger.

However, the report warned that history shows that playing political football with international inspection missions rarely leads to good results, considering that Iraq’s decision in 1998 to stop cooperating with international weapons inspectors is a reminder that if Iran takes this path, the most likely outcome is a toxic mixture of uncertainty and worst-case thinking that could lead to increased risks and miscalculation.

The report explained that if Iran wants to build a nuclear arsenal, it is forced to go along and accept this cost. However, if it wants to reduce the risks of a conflict that could be disastrous for it, and to provide space for President Masoud Peszechian to reopen nuclear negotiations with the West, then addressing doubts about its nuclear program, rather than reinforcing them, should be one of its top priorities. It added that transparency is not a magic cure, but it provides a tool for assessing dangerous expectations.

Inspection and the Iraq War

While the report stated that Iran’s cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency was fluctuating, but it did not completely cut off its participation, it pointed out that the nuclear era is full of examples of non-compliance, adding that only two countries, Iraq and North Korea, have actually expelled international inspectors.

The report stressed that the case of Iraq is particularly interesting because Saddam Hussein’s resistance to, and eventual rejection of, international weapons inspections contributed to strengthening American suspicions about weapons of mass destruction (which eventually turned out to be unfounded) and also strengthened the George W. Bush administration’s justifications for the invasion in 2003.

The American report considered that this incident highlights the risks raised by nuclear ambiguity, which all parties must take into consideration before embarking on a course of activities that are difficult to reverse.

The report stated that Iraq spent about two decades trying to manufacture a nuclear bomb, starting in the 1970s, explaining that in 1981, Israel obstructed these efforts by destroying the reactor that Baghdad planned to use as a source of plutonium. However, the regime secretly reshaped its program, following other paths to produce fissile materials and conducting research on the design of weapons and their delivery systems. The extent of this activity did not become clear until after Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War in 1991.

He added that the UN Security Council ordered Baghdad after the war to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction programs under the supervision of IAEA and UN inspectors, noting that despite Iraq’s acceptance of these conditions, its cooperation was fluctuating, and it often obstructed the work of the inspectors by providing false or incomplete information, tampering with evidence, and denying access to sites. However, despite Iraqi attempts at intransigence, the inspectors dismantled the bulk of the nuclear weapons infrastructure by the late 1990s, and they had a great understanding of the program.

The Carnegie Institute report saw that Saddam was angry at the humiliation of being forcibly disarmed and the continued imposition of sanctions, adding that Iraq announced in 1998 that it would stop cooperating with inspections.

He pointed out that after several fruitless diplomatic attempts, the United States and Britain resorted to a military response, and the inspection teams of the International Agency and the United Nations were evacuated, while Iraq refused to allow them to return or commit to disarmament programs.

“That is why the report said that undermining the inspections was a grave mistake for Saddam, as these decisions did not translate into greater influence or prestige, but instead were misread, while Iraq’s record of deceit and resistance influenced subsequent assessments of its motives and capabilities,” recalling in this context what Bush said in his 2002 speech entitled “Axis of Evil,” where he considered that “this regime agreed to inspections and then expelled the inspectors, and this regime has something to hide from the civilized world.”

The report pointed to the mutual misunderstanding between the two parties, explaining that Saddam Hussein, in return, wrongly assumed that the United States knew that Iraq no longer had an effective nuclear weapons program, whether there were inspectors on the ground or not, and therefore believed that Washington’s accusations of weapons of mass destruction were merely a pretext to force him to step down from power.

After the report said that “concerns about the Iraqi nuclear program were not solely responsible for the war,” explaining that many decision-makers in the United States contributed to promoting questionable intelligence information to justify their desire to change the regime, but it also considered that Saddam’s rejection of the international inspection mission made the controversial arguments and explanations more credible.

Iranian nuclear thought

After the American report said that Iran, like Iraq, has a history of secret nuclear activities, it reviewed Tehran’s nuclear path since the disclosure of its efforts in 2002, up until Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018, and the imposition of major sanctions on Iran, despite the fact that American intelligence and the International Atomic Energy Agency provided their assessment that Tehran is committed to the agreement.

The report also noted that Iran remained committed to fulfilling its obligations regarding international monitoring and verification, but since 2019, it has begun to back away from other obligations, such as restrictions on the size of its stockpile of enriched uranium and the level to which it can enrich, before returning to developing its relationship with the International Agency since 2021, before cooperation declined again after the assassination of a prominent Iranian nuclear scientist.

Although the U.S. intelligence community continues to assess that Iranian leaders have not decided to build a nuclear weapon, Iran’s enhanced nuclear weapons capability and waning international oversight contribute to greater uncertainty, he said, adding that deteriorating regional security dynamics, including Israeli strikes near Iranian nuclear facilities and the deterioration of Iran’s “proxies,” make the situation more volatile.

According to the report, Iran’s nuclear program could become more important in its defense strategy, noting that policymakers have already begun to threaten to put their country on the nuclear threshold for deterrence, including by confronting attacks on nuclear facilities, and that experts believe that the only thing standing between Iran and the nuclear bomb is the political decision.

The report found that in light of the insufficient international oversight, the risks and uncertainty are exacerbated, and the risks of miscalculation by the parties are magnified with the decline of international oversight, adding that diplomacy remains the best means of avoiding the worst outcomes.

The report doubted the effectiveness of a military strike against nuclear facilities, which would only delay progress in the program and increase Tehran’s determination to obtain nuclear weapons.

He also noted that since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has moved from pressuring Iran to prevent it from proliferation to protecting it from international oversight, making it more difficult to impose additional pressure on the regime. In addition, the report said, Iran also has reservations about the United States’ ability to ease sanctions and abide by agreements.

The report concluded that Iraq’s decision to restrict its cooperation with the global nuclear system provides a cautionary lesson for both Iran and the international community.

He warned that nuclear ambiguity could lead to misreading of intentions, while limiting oversight would make it more difficult for all sides to step back from the brink of a crisis, amplifying the risks of a wider regional war. At this turbulent moment, Iran and the United States should bear that in mind.

shafaq.com