Unusual calm… How did Al-Sudani push armed factions to leave the battlefield?
Unusual calm… How did Al-Sudani push armed factions to leave the battlefield?
2025-09-14 04:53
Shafaq News – Baghdad
Just a few years ago, the sounds of explosions targeting US bases in Iraq were an almost daily occurrence, leaving behind casualties and threatening statements, and putting the country on the brink of open regional confrontation.
These attacks were not merely military operations; they were tools of pressure used in the power play between Washington and Tehran, casting a shadow over every round of negotiations between them, even within the nuclear talks.
But today, the landscape appears to have changed radically. The pace of attacks has slowed to an unprecedented level, and the voice of threats has become muted. Meanwhile, the factions that had long been at the forefront of the escalation have become parties carefully calculating their steps, under pressure from political calculations and economic interests, and with the tacit support of the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.
Reading in the language of numbers
A special survey conducted by Shafaq News Agency reveals that the first year of al-Sudani’s term (October 2022-October 2023) was completely devoid of any attacks on US bases, despite the fact that the months immediately preceding witnessed repeated attacks during the political deadlock that preceded the formation of his government, which ended with the withdrawal of the Sadrist movement (currently the Shiite National Movement) from parliament following bloody clashes in the Green Zone.
While the number of attacks during Al-Sudani’s four-year tenure did not exceed 50, Mustafa Al-Kadhimi’s government, which lasted only two years, recorded approximately 150 attacks, indicating a fundamental shift in the rules of engagement.
After a year of silence, a new wave of attacks erupted with the outbreak of war between Israel and Hamas on October 7, 2023, in what the factions described as “unity of the arenas.”
October 2023
– October 17: Two attacks on Ain al-Assad.
– Between October 20 and 31: A series of drone attacks on Ain al-Asad and Harir near Erbil, some of which were thwarted by US air defenses.
At the end of the month, the US Department of Defense announced that its forces in Iraq and Syria had been subjected to 23 attacks in less than two weeks.
November 2023
November 6: Drone attack on Ain al-Asad and Harir.
– November 9: Three consecutive attacks on Ain al-Asad.
November 15: New missile attack on the base.
November 21 and 23: Rocket attacks followed by clashes with an unknown group outside the base.
December 2023 – January 2024
December 6 and 20: Missile attacks on Ain al-Asad, causing no damage.
– From January 20 to 26: Five consecutive attacks with Grad rockets and drones.
July – August 2024
-July 16 and 25: Attacks with explosive-laden drones.
August 5 and 6: Two new attacks, amid the Gaza blockade and factions’ demands for the withdrawal of US forces.
After that, the attacks ceased completely, even in the face of major regional events, including the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah in December 2024, the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the rise of Ahmad al-Sharaa in Syria, and even during the twelve-day war between Iran and Israel in early 2025. Only a single strike was recorded on March 19, 2025, against Ain al-Assad, and then silence returned.
“Interests over guns”
Security expert Ahmed Al-Sharifi attributes this shift to the fact that the factions, which were influential in forming Al-Sudani’s government, preferred not to embarrass or weaken the government through escalation, “especially after they obtained concessions and contracts that pumped their economic resources.”
Speaking to Shafaq News Agency, he added, “Economic and political interests required supporting the framework government and not escalating it… until the Gaza war came, and the equation was temporarily reversed.”
Al-Sharifi points out that Iran, despite its subsequent direct confrontation with Israel, did not push Iraqi factions to participate in the war, preferring to maintain calm on the Iraqi scene.
Despite the near-total cessation of attacks on US bases, tensions in other forms have not been devoid of them. Over the past few months, oil fields in the Kurdistan Region have been subjected to repeated attacks by drones and missiles, without any clear claim of responsibility.
Armed factions denied responsibility, but politicians and local officials in the region accused them of being behind the attacks with the aim of disrupting the internal situation and impacting oil production.
Security expert Ahmed Al-Sharifi points out that “these strikes do not appear to be part of the traditional resistance approach, but rather relate to investment conflicts over the gas sector between Iran and Russia. Some of these strikes targeted areas allied with the Coordination Framework, such as Sulaymaniyah, reflecting a clear international footprint.”
Retired Brigadier General Adnan Al-Kanani agrees with this analysis, noting that “the goal now is to protect interests, not engage in confrontations.”
Al-Kanani points out that Al-Sudani’s government has granted massive investments to American companies and businessmen such as Naguib Sawiris to build a residential city and launch a 5G telecommunications network. He argues that Sawiris is viewed in Iraqi circles as close to Western interests, and that “whoever controls telecommunications controls the command center.”
However, Amer al-Fayez, a leader in the Coordination Framework, which includes a number of prominent armed factions, told Shafaq News Agency that “the current orientation of the armed factions is in favor of Iraq’s stability and against involving the country in any side battles or any regional conflict.”
The rules of the game change
Amid this shift came the surprising announcement on Tuesday of the release of Israeli-Russian researcher Tsurkov, who was kidnapped in Baghdad in March 2023 by Kataib Hezbollah, one of the most prominent factions targeting American interests.
The announcement came across three simultaneous channels: a tweet by US President Donald Trump, a statement from the US embassy in Iraq, and an official statement from Al-Sudani.
The release raised questions about whether the deal was part of an undisclosed understanding between Washington and Kata’ib Hezbollah, further indicating a shift in the factions’ mentality from confrontation to understanding.
This shift is not limited to security matters; it also points to a reengineering of the relationship between Iraq and the two poles of influence—Washington and Tehran. While the United States views reducing attacks as a gateway to Iraq’s economic reintegration, the factions see reining in their behavior as an opportunity to consolidate their political and financial influence from within state institutions rather than engaging in confrontations externally.
shafaq.com
