Two political goals for Al-Sudani and an implicit bet on the Sadrists’ vote at the last minute

Two political goals for Al-Sudani and an implicit bet on the Sadrists’ vote at the last minute

2025-09-09 03:50

Shafaq News – Special Translation
The Atlantic Council described Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s move to confront Kata’ib Hezbollah as a “rare, bold, and calculated step,” identifying two objectives: to bolster his electoral success and to undermine the proposed legislation in the Iraqi parliament to restructure the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The Atlantic Council noted the possibility that Sadrist leader Muqtada al-Sadr might resort to pushing his supporters to vote at the last minute for opponents of the Coordination Framework.

In a report translated by Shafaq News Agency, the American Institute considered the Iraqi government’s unprecedented accusation against Kata’ib Hezbollah of carrying out an armed attack on the government’s Agriculture Directorate a month ago a move that could weaken the most disciplined and feared pro-Iran militia in Iraq.

The US report considered the Sudanese government’s willingness to confront Kataib Hezbollah, the most powerful and ideologically aligned militia loyal to Iran and previously targeted by the United States, a “rare and bold step.” However, it noted that the government’s resolve will be further tested by fulfilling its promise to file a lawsuit against the Kataib Hezbollah members who perpetrated the attack.

After reiterating that al-Sudani’s actions against the Kataib Hezbollah were “bold and calculated,” the report said they appeared to be aimed at two things. The first relates to his electoral policy, as al-Sudani’s “Reconstruction and Development Coalition” is challenging the “Coordination Framework,” the current parliamentary bloc that appointed him prime minister in 2022 but opposes his second term.

Al-Sudani’s second goal, according to the report, is to undermine legislation proposed in the House of Representatives to restructure the Popular Mobilization Forces along the lines of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. The report notes that Kata’ib Hezbollah, a prominent supporter of the legislation, would benefit greatly from it.

Noting Washington’s strong objections to the legislation, as well as those of Sunni, Kurdish, and some Shiite MPs, the report explained that if passed, it would significantly strengthen the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and threaten al-Sudani’s chances of a second term, similar to the role the PMF played in 2022 in preventing the Sadrists from assuming power following their electoral victory in the 2021 parliamentary elections.

The report continued, stating that even if al-Sudani is able to overcome this obstacle—which is possible if he achieves a large enough electoral victory—the strengthening of the Popular Mobilization Forces will make al-Sudani’s second term more difficult, hindering promised reforms and exacerbating the already ineffective and chaotic decision-making process.

According to the report, all Iraqi prime ministers, with the exception of Adel Abdul Mahdi, whom the report described as “completely subservient to the PMF and its main supporter,” have suffered from the PMF’s ongoing political abuses and the erosion of the prime minister’s authority since its inception.

Sadrists

While the report noted the growing public anger over the failures of the ruling Shiite elite, and the Coordination Framework leaders’ fears of a popular uprising and the possibility of a Sadrist takeover, it explained that these fears were exacerbated by the Sadrists’ refusal to participate in the elections. This raises the possibility of street protests supported by the Sadrists, especially after Muqtada al-Sadr announced, as a precondition, the “dissolution of the militias and the strengthening of the army.”

The report stated that al-Sadr could inflict significant political damage on the Coordination Framework, noting that one option being circulated among Sadrists is to direct Sadrist voters at the last minute to vote for the Coordination Framework’s rivals, whose “electoral platform includes disbanding the militias and integrating the Popular Mobilization Forces into the security forces.”

The report suggested that this move would likely result in a defeat for the Coordination Framework at the ballot box, complicating its ability to retain power. It noted that al-Sudani’s party and secular forces loyal to the October protests, which oppose the ruling Shiite parties, could leverage this possibility to secure approximately one million Sadrist votes.

The institute noted in its report that this is the reason why al-Sadr recently called on his supporters to update their electoral records.

US

Faced with the alarming possibility of a defeat for the Coordination Framework, the report stated that its forces will consolidate their ranks further to maintain their grip on power, and this may include support for proposed legislation in the future.

However, the report noted that due to US pressure, the Coordination Framework forces have postponed the bill for the time being. The report considered that if Washington wants to ensure the bill’s repeal and prevent its reappearance in a different form, it must reinforce its opposition to the measure by outlining a list of consequences if it is passed. These include the potential cancellation of US protection of Iraqi oil revenues under Presidential Executive Order 13303 of 2003, which Washington renews annually; and the possibility of the United States withdrawing from the 2008 Strategic Framework Agreement, which formally defines relations of “friendship and cooperation” between the two countries. Accordingly, it will be difficult for either partner to accept the other entrenching a hostile entity whose members it has openly threatened to kill, as militias have proudly done in the past and pledged to continue doing in the future.

The report concluded that the United States must support Sudan’s currently limited actions against the militias and encourage him to expand his efforts to control them through institutional arrangements that depoliticize them and place them under firm state control.

The US report concluded by stating that given the “severe blows suffered by the axis of resistance, led by a weakened Iran, this goal is now achievable, and it is an opportunity that should not be wasted.”

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