From September to June: Details of al-Zaydi’s plan to disarm the factions
From September to June: Details of al-Zaydi’s plan to disarm the factions
2026-09-25
Shafaq News – Special Translation
The British website “ Amwaj ” believes that Iraq’s move to bring the factions under state authority, while postponing the date for handing over their weapons to June 30 of next year, and gradually integrating the fighters into the regular forces, within a timetable, places less emphasis on the idea of rapid control, and more on finding a politically practical way to achieve this.
The British website, in a report translated by Shafaq News Agency, considered that the formalization of the Popular Mobilization Units in 2016 did not resolve the legal status of the factions within and around it, noting that the coordination framework agreed on May 9 to form a committee headed by Prime Minister Ali al-Zubaidi, his predecessor Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, and the leader of the Badr Organization, Hadi al-Amiri, whose mission is to register weapons, classify armed groups, and study options for integrating fighters into civilian institutions or official security forces.
The report indicated that by mid-August, senior leaders of the Coordination Framework were proposing a formula for “managing” the weapons of the “resistance” factions, including Kataib Hezbollah and Al-Nujaba, to replace immediate disarmament with “regulating” the weapons.
The report noted that, with armed groups attaching their own conditions to any disarmament arrangements, the September 30 deadline became difficult to implement, while disagreements within the coordination framework over efforts to develop a unified approach became more complex, as some factions resisted the idea that the ruling political alliance could determine their military status.
According to the report, al-Zaydi’s plan to monopolize weapons in the hands of the state by June 2027 formalizes a distinction that has emerged in recent months: individual fighters can join the Popular Mobilization Forces, while “resistance” factions will lose their status as independent armed entities.
He went on to say that if the plan is implemented, one of the main issues will likely revolve around how to reproduce the leadership networks and political influence of the integrated fighters once they enter the state’s security apparatus.
The report suggested that setting a deadline for next year would shift the focus from exceeding the September 30 deadline to implementation mechanisms, adding that it should not be assumed that a longer timeframe automatically makes negotiations with “resistance” factions easier.
The report noted that Baghdad is likely to prioritize the registration of weapons and the integration of individuals in the coming months, while armed groups are likely to seek assurances about the process and its future status.
He went on to say that progress on the Popular Mobilization Forces’ service and retirement law could affect how fighters are integrated into the overall force, and the dynamics of separating the PMF from politics.
The report noted that the scheduled withdrawal date of September 30 for coalition forces may resolve one major point of contention, but disputes over the independence of the factions are likely to continue.
The report concluded by saying that the initial 90-day period of al-Zaydi’s 6-point plan, which requires a halt to attacks on the coalition and US interests, could be fragile, noting that any renewed attacks by armed factions would undermine the conditions for implementation and provide grounds for the process to be suspended.
shafaq.com
