The success of Sudanese’s visit to Washington requires taking risks

The success of Sudanese’s visit to Washington requires taking risks

2-9-2024

Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani is expected to pay a visit to the United States amid thorny issues, most notably the influence of militias. According to analysts, the Sudanese can be a real prime minister of a real, sovereign state if he wants to, but that will require taking risks.

The Iraqi terrorist “Hezbollah Brigades” announced on January 30, 2024 that it would suspend its operations against American bases in Iraq, Syria, and any other place, perhaps “in order to embarrass the Iraqi government.”

Following this announcement, a media agent for Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shiaa Al-Sudani said that the suspension of the attacks was due to the “intensive” efforts made by Al-Sudani, who was “working hard” to rein in the militias.

Michael Knights, a specialist in military and security affairs for Iraq, Iran, and the Arab Gulf states, says in a report published by the Washington Institute that, since the Sudanese is eager to achieve his ambition of making an official visit to the White House this year, perhaps in April, he has enough reasons to appear A strong person with a positive influence.

Knights adds that for Al-Sudani, like any leader in the world who tries to maintain respect inside and outside his country, his acceptance into the Oval Office is the gold standard for him to gain international support, and this would enhance his chances of being appointed again after the general elections in October 2025 in Iraq.

But the current shameful reality is that Al-Sudani was not appointed until after the politicized judiciary took control of Iraq’s 2021 elections in favor of the “coordinating framework” led by a cabal of Iranian-backed terrorist groups.

The Popular Mobilization Forces, which includes the militias that Baghdad allows to operate, should not run Iraqi state institutions

Al-Sudani was installed as prime minister, accompanied by instructions to manage the “resistance government” only in his capacity as its “director-general.”

In the words of a prominent supporter of the movements listed on the US terrorist list in Iraq after Al-Sudani’s appointment, his role is limited to “providing political cover for the resistance.”

The most credible reason, that is, what really prompted Kataib Hezbollah to step down, is the arrival of the commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Baghdad.

The motive behind this visit may be Iran’s desire to avoid being subjected to a strike from the United States, hence the ridiculous claim of “Kata’ib Hezbollah” that Iran was not aware of the many attacks it launched against Americans.

Likewise, Iran may not want the killing of a large part of the Hezbollah Brigades leadership at the hands of the Americans.

If the Iranian-backed “resistance” does not want to embarrass Al-Sudani, this is for two unparalleled reasons: first, because the Iranian-backed terrorist groups are satisfied with the presence of Al-Sudani as an unbanned front for the nominal leadership of Iraq, and second, because it expects Al-Sudani to soon carry out the operation to remove American forces from… Iraq within a specific time frame.

This expectation is of great importance to Iran, given that the United States is about to impose sanctions and strike many parts of the Iraqi state that were seized by the “Hezbollah Brigades” and other terrorist groups during the “coordination framework”’s seizure of many ministerial portfolios in the country.

Al-Sudani worked at all levels of the Iraqi government, as mayor, governor, minister (many times), and now as prime minister. He is most likely not happy working in the service of the militias and aspires to more than that and to be a real prime minister of a real state, but this goal cannot be achieved unless this happens. Strong international and local support to change Iraq’s corrupt regime.

Today, deep inside Sudanese lives a hardworking leader who is merely unable to break free from the grip of the terrorist groups and militias with whom he made a devilish deal to become prime minister in the first place.

Invading militia
Invading militia
Through his upcoming visit to the White House, the Sudanese Prime Minister seeks to prevent major military retaliation in response to the escalating provocations from Iranian agents in Iraq, and therefore he must provide the following:

1. The Iraqi Prime Minister must show his strength: Al-Sudani deals meekly with terrorist groups and militias within his government. The United States should encourage him to take risks and say publicly, “The Constitution stipulates that the Iraqi Prime Minister is the Supreme Commander, not a group of militia leaders.” It is time for some groups, such as the Hezbollah Brigades, to stop addressing the public as if they were running the Iraqi state. The Hezbollah Brigades have put Iraq in an embarrassing situation, by their own admission, and will be punished for their actions.” Al-Sudani may turn against those who helped him, but if he wants to become a true leader, there is no better time than now, and if he fails now, the United States must realize that he has no intention of ever emerging from the mantle of sponsors of terrorism.

2. Kataib Hezbollah members must be expelled from the top leadership of the Popular Mobilization Forces: No senior member of Kataib Hezbollah, of whom the United States can list many, should run the institutions of the Iraqi state, specifically the umbrella Popular Mobilization Forces. To the militias that the state allows to operate, including (but not limited to) Abu Fdak (also known as Abdulaziz al-Muhammadawi), the current head of operations in the Popular Mobilization Forces, and Abu Zainab al-Lami (also known as Hussein Falih Aziz al-Lami), the corrupt head of security in the Popular Mobilization Forces. Popular Mobilization Forces, who is subject to sanctions for human rights violations, and Abu Iman al-Bahali (also known as Azab Kaitan al-Bahali, Sattar Jabbar al-Taaban), the head of intelligence for the Popular Mobilization Forces who is on the US sanctions list. The three Hezbollah Brigades (45, 46, 47) of the Popular Mobilization Forces should eventually be disbanded.

3. Kataib Hezbollah leader Abu al-Hussein should be exiled from Iraq: When the United States targeted Iranian proxies in the past, they often left for Iran for a period of time. This should be expected from the Secretary-General of the Kataib Hezbollah movement, Abu Hussein (also known as Ahmed Mohsen Faraj al-Hamidawi), and any other key members identified by the United States. As long as they do not return to Iraq, they will not be targeted.

4. “Kata’ib Hezbollah” must be eradicated from the financial and industrial systems: The United States recently targeted the airline companies (Fly Baghdad and Al-Huda Bank) affiliated with “Kata’ib Hezbollah” and this process must go deeper, including removing the group’s companies from the banking system. The entire Iraqi intelligence services, airports, customs centers and the industrial sector.

5. The perpetrators of the January 27 attacks should be tried for terrorism and serve their full sentences: The Iraqi terrorists who killed three Americans on January 27 in Jordan should be sought through a joint Iraq-US investigation, tried under Iraqi terrorism laws, and given the longest possible prison term. Possible. Their names and faces must be made public, unlike what happened in previous cases where Americans were expected to just trust the “resistance government” that they had imprisoned a real person and he remained in prison.

The problem is not limited to the “Hezbollah Brigades” at all. Similar terrorist groups, such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, must also be eradicated and removed from major government and commercial systems. There are also groups adjacent to terrorism, such as the Badr Organization, which must be considered as potential targets for sanctions due to their fundamental participation in enabling movements classified as terrorist to manage huge corruption projects in Iraq. However, the “Hezbollah Brigades” constitute an appropriate symbolic test for Al-Sudani, and securing the above-mentioned achievements is considered a very appropriate step to begin a dialogue about reducing the American presence in Iraq, but as soon as possible. The United States will not withdraw from Iraq under fire, so a continued suspension of attacks is an important first step.

Regarding Al-Sudani’s visit to the United States, we must see what the Iraqi Prime Minister can achieve before confirming this important invitation. One might wonder, was Sudanese “working hard” or making “intensive” efforts before January 30, when since October 17, 2023, American forces were attacked nearly 180 times from and in Iraq or by Iraqis at American bases in Syria? And Jordan? One might wonder whether Al-Sudani deserved a visit to the White House and a reception in the Oval Office like Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, if all he did was a belated attempt to submit to a ceasefire offered by Iran and its terrorist partners because the United States was about to attack.

Knights believes that Washington must first let Al-Sudani prove that his role is more than just a “general manager” of a gang of terrorists running Iraq today.

Knights adds, “A Sudanese can be a real prime minister of a real, sovereign state if he wants to, but that will require taking risks, and then he can get a hero’s welcome in Washington.”

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