Al-Halbousi’s resignation and the problem of Al-Sadr?

Al-Halbousi’s resignation and the problem of Al-Sadr?


Al-Halbousis resignation and the problem of Al-SadrThe question that has become a station in all Iraqi political circles in recent days revolves around one axis, which is “What does al-Sadr want ?” Everyone asserts that no one can anticipate or predict what the leader of the Sadrist movement is thinking, or understand the directions and options that he can resort to in dealing with the political and governmental crisis.

The announcement of the formation of the “State Administration Alliance” with the participation of the two main Kurdish component parties , the Patriotic Union led by Bafel Taliban and the Democratic Party led by Massoud Barzani, and the two blocs of the Sunni component, and Sovereignty led by Parliament Speaker Muhammad al -Halbousi and Azm led by Khamis al-Khanjar, along with the Shiite coordinating framework forces, reveals new features that are beginning to take shape In the political space between the forces representing the Iraqi components, away from or in isolation from al-Sadr, but without closing the door for him to join this formation on the basis of consensus and partnership and abandoning the demand of the political majority.

Parliament Speaker Muhammad al-Halbousi was clear in justifying the resignation request, which he included on the agenda of the parliamentary session, and its importance in efforts to reactivate the parliament’s work, which was suspended by the Sadr movement after the mass resignation of its deputies when he spoke of a fundamental and fundamental change in the composition of the alliances that ruled the previous stage. And that the presidency of the parliament, which was the result of the tripartite “Save the Homeland” alliance between the Sunni component, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Sadrist movement, lost its representative legitimacy after the Sadrist resignation and the change in the sizes of the blocs represented in Parliament after replacing the resigned with others, most of whom are from the coordination framework that has the greatest weight within Parliament and representation the broader Shiite component.

Al-Halbousi’s step of resigning, which came less than 24 hours after the announcement of the “state administration” alliance, applies to the popular proverb “more than a bird with one stone.” In the first place, it constitutes a starting point for him to renew his legitimacy in the presidency of Parliament with the votes of the representatives of the Shiite framework that was seeking and demanding his dismissal. And removing him from the presidency, as he is the spearhead of the tripartite alliance on which efforts were made to reach an understanding on a consensual government. It is sufficient for these representatives to vote to reject the resignation request to achieve this goal.

In the second dimension, the joining of Al-Halbousi with the dagger in addition to the Democratic Party is considered as announcing the death of the tripartite alliance “Save the Homeland”, which was formed in partnership with the Sadrist movement. What this means is the announcement of the death of the project of the political majority government, which was the basis for the formation of this alliance.

In the special dimension within the Sunni component, al-Halbousi was able to push the coordinating framework to abandon his allies in his areas of influence in the western governorates, specifically in Anbar from the Sunni component, which means dedicating his leadership and leadership to the political scene as a representative of this component in the political process.

Reproducing al-Halbousi’s presidency of the parliament or the legislative authority on the basis of partnership this time with the Shiite coordination framework, may be part of the deal that took place between him and the forces and parties that formed the “state administration” alliance, which laid in the paper the understanding signed by all the participating parties as main foundations. It serves as a declaration of intent for the next stage, which includes a political, security and economic plan, which includes most of the concerns that posed obstacles to understandings and settlements and is consistent with the initiative that Al-Halbousi had previously presented weeks ago, in conjunction with the emergence of serious indications of a shift within the forces on which the Triple Alliance is based, especially after a battle The Green Zone between Saraya al-Salam, the military arm of the Sadrist movement and the forces affiliated with the Popular Mobilization. Including ending the armed presence of the factions in Iraqi cities, and removing the centers, headquarters and barracks of the Popular Mobilization and the armed forces to the outskirts of these cities, as well as setting up a new mechanism in dealing with justice, question and exclusion.

These successive developments experienced by the Iraqi political scene, and the re-mixing of alliances, balances, and orientations, put all the political forces of the various components, which until recently were in an open and null conflict between each other, in the context of a new equation from the alliance, whose first, fundamental and most prominent result is that it put them in Confronting Muqtada al-Sadr and his movement, which has become almost besieged, and if he insists on not going to understanding and dialogue and insisting on his positions and demands, it may put him in a circle of isolation and outside the political process. In this case, matters become open to all possibilities, especially for al-Sadr, who may not hesitate to resort to the street again to thwart the understandings that were drawn on new foundations and premises, and contributed to his loss of his allies from other components.

If the political and component concerns that prompted Al-Halbousi to make such a deal with the coordination framework, to abandon his alliance with Al-Sadr and move to the camp opposing him, other reasons may have played a determined role in changing the position of the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Massoud Barzani and abandoning his solid alliance with the chest. These reasons may not be confined to the Iraqi interior and the power struggle, and the gains it achieved as a result of the agreement with the coordinating framework in the field of oil and gas law, the relationship between the region and some disputed areas in Kirkuk and Sinjar, and the region’s share of the general budget. Rather, it may be for reasons that contribute to Barzani’s efforts to calm the negative Iranian position on him after Tehran accused him of playing a negative role in fueling the Kurdish movement inside Iran against the background of the killing of the Kurdish girl “Mahsa Amini” at the hands of the morality police.

The coalition of state administration put al-Sadr in the face of one of two options, either to go to the opposition and the street, or to accept the proposed settlements, and the maximum that the framework could offer him, by sharing the share of the Shiite component in the government, and what came of reconsidering some of the military aspects related to the mobilization Its spread and role, as an entry point for understanding over a compromise candidate for prime minister, according to which the framework abandons his candidate, Muhammad Shia Al-Sudani, and Al-Sadr abandons the renewal demand of Mustafa Al-Kazemi.