The American withdrawal from Iraq: between illusion and reality

The American withdrawal from Iraq: between illusion and reality

2026-09-29

The American withdrawal from Iraq - between illusion and realityDr. Gutiar Tamr
One day later, on September 30, 2026, the withdrawal of the United States and international coalition forces from Iraq will reach its announced and final date. Thus, a military phase that has extended, in various forms, since 2003 will end, and the Iraqi state will enter a new phase in which it is supposed to bear greater responsibility for its security, its airspace, the pursuit of ISIS, and the protection of its institutions and borders. But the problem begins precisely here, because the end of the foreign military presence does not necessarily mean the completion of sovereignty, and the departure of the forces does not automatically resolve the question of who possesses power, who decides to use it, and who has the ability to protect the state when it is threatened.

The official Iraqi discourse has treated September 30 as a moment of restoring sovereignty, a description that is politically understandable, but not sufficient from a strategic standpoint. Sovereignty is not merely the absence of foreign forces from the land, but rather the state’s ability to monopolize security and military decisions, protect its airspace, pursue armed groups outside its institutional structure, and prevent its territory from being used as a platform for others’ conflicts. Therefore, the day after the withdrawal will, in reality, be the most difficult test for the Iraqi state, not the end of the test.

The most striking paradox is that the withdrawal will be completed by the end of September, while Iraq has not yet resolved the issue of weapons outside the state’s full control. Prime Minister Ali al-Zubaidi has moved from the date he previously proposed to end the issue of the factions’ weapons on September 30 to a new plan ending on June 30, 2027. According to the announced plan, the process begins with a ninety-day de-escalation phase during which the factions refrain from launching attacks, in exchange for not being targeted by the American forces. Then the process of transferring weapons to the authority of the state will begin gradually until the end of next June. The American envoy confirmed that Washington and Baghdad agree that, by that date, the state will have the military monopoly.

But the problem is that this timetable does not have the consensus of the factions; some of them demanded that the deadline be extended to the end of 2027, while reservations appeared within the same coordination framework about setting a binding date, considering that setting a strict time limit may complicate negotiations with the armed factions. Herein lies the gray area that Iraq will find itself in after September 30: foreign forces leave, but the state’s monopoly on weapons is not achieved on the same day. This means that the state will enter a new phase and is required to manage the balance between armed forces that possess military and political capabilities, and a declared governmental commitment to restoring the power to the institutions of the state.

This is the difference between withdrawal and sovereignty; withdrawal is a military decision that can be scheduled and implemented, while sovereignty is a long institutional process that does not begin and end with a timetable. If foreign forces leave and the power remains distributed between the state and multiple loyalist factions, the vacuum left by the withdrawal will not necessarily be a geographical vacuum, but may turn into a vacuum in the decision-making center. This does not mean that Iraq is entering a phase devoid of military capability, as Iraqi forces have proven in recent years their ability to carry out operations against the remnants of ISIS, including the use of Iraqi F-16 aircraft in airstrikes targeting the organization’s hideouts in the Kirkuk and Salah al-Din regions. In September alone, Iraqi forces carried out airstrikes against the organization’s positions, and also conducted continuous ground and security operations.

But the existence of this capability does not negate another question: Can the Iraqi system maintain the same level of efficiency without international support in the areas of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, technical support, training, and maintenance? This is the real test that will begin after the withdrawal. Iraq is not starting from scratch, but it also does not transition from dependence on the coalition to self-sufficiency simply by the departure of the last foreign soldier. More importantly, ISIS is no longer a force controlling cities and territories as it was before 2017, but it has not disappeared from the security landscape. On September 27, the village of Al-Malha in Kirkuk Governorate was attacked with mortar shells, and security sources reported the death of a woman and the injury of civilians. On the same day, Iraqi forces clashed with militants wearing suicide belts near Altun Kupri, resulting in the death of two of them and the injury and arrest of a third. These incidents do not mean that ISIS has returned to its former strength, but they confirm that the organization still possesses the ability to move, hide, and carry out operations in rural, mountainous, and desert areas. Therefore, the question after the withdrawal is not: Has ISIS returned? But the question is: Can the Iraqi state prevent the remnants of the organization from turning areas with fragile security into spaces to rebuild its capabilities?

Hence, Kirkuk and the contact zones become more important; the disputed areas are not just a security geography, but an area where the responsibilities of the Iraqi army and the Peshmerga intersect, and the issue of security coordination becomes complicated. Any weakness in coordination can turn into a loophole that the organization can exploit. Therefore, the American withdrawal puts Baghdad and Erbil in front of the necessity to move from situational coordination to building a more clear joint security system in the areas where responsibilities overlap.

In the Kurdistan Region, however, the matter is more sensitive. The withdrawal is not limited to leaving bases in Baghdad or the federal areas, but also includes the forces and defense systems present in the region. The Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs announced on September 28 that the departure of US and coalition forces on September 30 would leave the region without an air defense system, and considered that protecting the region’s airspace, as part of Iraqi airspace, falls under the responsibility of the federal government. Herein lies one of the most sensitive paradoxes of the new phase. The Kurdistan Region does not have an independent decision regarding air defense, because the airspace is part of Iraqi sovereignty, while its own capabilities in this field are limited. Thus, the Kurdish question after the withdrawal becomes an Iraqi question as well: Can Baghdad provide protection for the region’s airspace as it provides it for the rest of Iraq? And can the security relationship between the Iraqi army and the Peshmerga be transformed from a temporary arrangement into a genuine federal defense system?

This question becomes even more important due to the attacks the region has suffered in recent months. On September 28, three marches targeted a camp of the Iranian Kurdish opposition in the Koya area, southeast of Erbil, continuing a series of attacks on sites within the region during the regional escalation. This means that the region is entering a phase of withdrawal in a volatile regional environment, not in a stable security situation where the departure of the American defense umbrella can be treated as a mere administrative transition. Conversely, on September 21, Kurdistan witnessed an important institutional step represented by the official announcement of the unification and reorganization of the Peshmerga forces under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs, after many years of two military structures linked to the two main political forces in the region. The ministry announced that the forces are now within a unified command and control structure, while the presidency of the region confirmed that the unification represents the beginning of a new phase. However, the value of this step should not be measured by its political celebration alone, but rather by what it will produce on the ground. Institutional unification acquires its true meaning when military decision-making becomes unified, the chain of command is clear, funding, arming, and training are subject to a single institution, and loyalty is to the institution, not to political forces. Different readings have already emerged regarding the extent to which this transformation has been practically completed, making the next stage the actual test of unification, not merely its announcement.

Here, the paths of Baghdad and Erbil can converge at a single point; Baghdad is required to confine weapons to the state, and Erbil is required to transform the unification of the Peshmerga into a stable military institution; and in both cases, the legal formula alone is not enough. The modern state is not based only on the existence of institutions that bear official names, but rather on the existence of a clear decision-making chain capable of implementing what it decides. Therefore, the withdrawal of the United States places Baghdad and Erbil before an opportunity and a test at the same time; the opportunity lies in redefining the Iraqi security relationship on the basis of the state and institutions, and the test lies in the ability of the two parties to build joint defense arrangements that do not make the region a security zone separate from Iraq, and do not make Baghdad view the security of the region as a secondary issue; and if Iraqi airspace is one constitutionally, then the responsibility for protecting it must also be one in practice.

On the political level, Iraq will enter a more sensitive phase in its relationship with Washington and Tehran after September 30. The direct American withdrawal will reduce the American military presence inside Iraq, but it does not mean the end of the Iraqi-American relationship. Other forms of security, intelligence, and defense cooperation may continue through new bilateral arrangements, which makes the military withdrawal different from a political and strategic separation. At the same time, the end of the American military presence removes one of the main arguments used by armed factions to justify the continuation of their weapons. However, this does not mean that the issue of weapons will end automatically. Armed factions have announced that they link giving up weapons to the withdrawal of foreign forces, while the government says that the state’s monopoly on weapons is necessary to move to the new phase.

Thus, after September 30, the question may shift from one about the presence of foreign forces to a more profound one: What does the state do when there is no longer a foreign presence that can be held responsible for security lapses? At that point, the government’s ability to impose unified rules, manage weapons, protect airspace, control borders, and deal with internal threats will become the standard by which the state will be measured. From this perspective, the relationship with Iran must also be viewed without simplification; Iraq is located in a region where Iranian, American, and Turkish interests overlap, and it cannot erase this reality simply by withdrawing a military force from its territory. What is required is not for Iraq to move from one umbrella to another, but rather to build the capacity of a state that allows it to manage its foreign relations from a more balanced institutional position.

As for the Kurdistan Region, it will face a more complex equation: the need for continued international cooperation on the one hand, and the need to develop its defense capabilities within the Iraqi framework on the other. Therefore, the practical option does not seem to be in refusing to withdraw, nor in ignoring its risks, but rather in building new arrangements that include air defense, intelligence sharing, coordination between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi army, and continued training and technical support through bilateral relations with the countries that participated in supporting Iraq and the region during the past years.

The most dangerous thing that could happen is for Iraq to treat September 30 as the end of the problem, when in reality it is the beginning of a new phase of responsibility. The withdrawal of foreign forces may close a military chapter, but it opens a more difficult political and security chapter. In this chapter, the question will not be: Did the Americans withdraw? That is a given. Rather, the question will be: Can the state fill the space left by the withdrawal? A state that wants full sovereignty needs a capable army, an effective air force, air defenses that protect its airspace, intelligence agencies that have information before danger occurs, political institutions capable of making decisions, and weapons that no other party disputes. It also needs a clear federal relationship between Baghdad and Erbil, because security in Iraq cannot be divided in a way that makes a threat in Kirkuk a federal issue and a threat in Erbil a regional issue, while the airspace, borders, and regional threats are one and the same.

Therefore, the American withdrawal should not be viewed as a complete victory, nor as an inevitable catastrophe. It is a strategic event that shifts responsibility more heavily onto the Iraqi state, while simultaneously revealing the level of preparedness of its institutions to bear that responsibility. If Baghdad and Erbil succeed in transforming the post-withdrawal phase into one of building joint security institutions, the departure of foreign forces could mark a different beginning for the relationship between the state and its institutions. However, if weapons remain dispersed, security decisions fragmented, air defense absent, and federal coordination fragile, then the withdrawal alone will not create sovereignty. Sovereignty does not begin with the departure of foreign soldiers and end at the borders. Sovereignty begins when decisions regarding war and peace, weapons, defense, and security become a single institutional decision. On September 30, a long military presence will end, but the real question will begin the following day: Has Iraq become capable of protecting itself, or has it merely moved from a stage of dependence on foreign power to a stage of testing its ability to build its own strength?

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