ICP Recommends Compromises to Resolve Iraqi Crisis

To overcome Iraq’s current political crisis and prevent the breakdown of the entire post-2003 order, Prime Minister Maliki (pictured) and his opponents both will have to agree to painful compromises, according to this report from the International Crisis Group:


At first glance, the current Iraqi political crisis looks like just one more predictable bump in the long road from dictatorship to democracy. Every two years or so, the political class experiences a prolonged stalemate; just as regularly, it is overcome. So, one might think, it will be this time around.

But look closer and the picture changes. The tug of war over Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s second term suggests something far worse: that a badly conceived, deeply flawed political process has turned into a chronic crisis that could bring down the existing political structure.

To avoid this outcome, both Maliki and his opponents need to make painful compromises: the prime minister should implement the power-sharing deal negotiated in 2010 and pledge to step down at the end of his term; in turn, his rivals should call off efforts to unseat him and instead use their parliamentary strength to build strong state institutions, such as an independent electoral commission, and ensure free and fair elections in two years’ time.

The present stalemate has its immediate roots in the Erbil accord between key political actors, which led to the second Maliki government. Key elements of the power-sharing agreement, which political leaders reached in a rush in November 2010 as impatience with the absence of a government grew, were never carried out.

Instead, the prime minister’s critics accuse him of violating the constitution, steadily amassing power at the expense of other government branches – parliament, the judiciary as well as independent commissions and agencies – and bringing security forces under his direct personal control. They also criticise him for reneging on crucial aspects of the understanding, notably by failing to fairly apportion sensitive security positions.

When, in December 2011, the judiciary issued an arrest warrant against Vice President Tareq al-Hashimi – a vocal Maliki critic – whatever good-will remained collapsed. Several of the prime minister’s partners boycotted the government, arguing that he increasingly was veering toward indefinite, autocratic rule. While they returned to the council of ministers after a few weeks, Maliki’s opponents – which include a broad array of Sunnis, Kurds, but also Shiites – have since vowed to unseat him through a parliamentary no-confidence vote.

The prime minister’s detractors have a case. A master at navigating the grey areas of law and constitution, he has steadily concentrated authority since 2006. But they also have a fair share of responsibility, having signally failed to marshal their parliamentary strength to pass legislation that would keep Maliki’s growing power in check.

Arguably, had they devoted their energies to the hard work of confronting him through institutions, they would not have found themselves compelled to seek a no-confidence vote as a last resort to block his apparent path toward autocratic rule. If, as is undeniable, Maliki has added to his powers during his six-year tenure, there can be no question that a large part of his success derives from his rivals’ incapacity to thwart him via institutional means.

It is unclear how this imbroglio will end, although at this rate and without a tangible change in all sides’ behaviour, it almost certainly will end badly. Regardless of whether he survives in office, Maliki has lost the trust of vast segments of the political class, including among former Shiite allies.At the same time, opposition members are deeply divided, both on fundamental substantive issues and on whether to push Maliki to implement the Erbil agreement or remove him once and for all.

The odds that they can muster the required votes to unseat him are low; even should they succeed, they are highly unlikely to agree on a common platform to form an alternative government. This would leave Maliki as caretaker prime minister until the next elections in 2014. In the meantime, his government will increasingly find it difficult to govern. All Iraqis will pay a price.

Iraq’s predicament is a symptom of a problem that goes far deeper than the unimplemented Erbil understanding or even Maliki’s personality. It directly relates to the inability to overcome the legacy of Saddam Hussein’s regime and its repressive practices: a culture of deep suspicion coupled with a winner-take-all and loser-lose-all form of politics.

Because it never produced a fair, agreed-upon distribution of power, territory and resources, the political bargaining that followed the regime’s fall did little to remedy this situation. The constitutional order the U.S. occupying power midwifed was an awkward patchwork that did not address core issues – the nature of the federal system; the powers of the president, prime minister and parliament; even the identity of the state and its people.

Worse, by solidifying an ethno-sectarian conception of politics, it helped fuel a conflict that at times has been more violent, at others more subdued, but has never wholly vanished.

The recurrent political crises that have plagued Iraq are the logical manifestations of this original flaw. Not once did the outcome of these recent cases tackle, let alone fix, the source of the impasse; rather, they were more like band aids, superficial agreements leaving issues either wholly unresolved or resolved but without an enforceable implementation mechanism.

What is more, with each episode the wound grows deeper: the gap between political parties widens, bolstering centrifugal forces first manifested in the 2005 process of drafting the constitution as well as in the substance of the text.

This time, political leaders must do more than merely patch things up and live to fight another day, without touching root causes. A quick fix today could mean a comprehensive breakdown tomorrow: the 2014 parliamentary elections loom, and for all parties stakes are higher than ever.

Without an agreement on constitutional and legal rules of the game, the prime minister desperately will seek to cling to power and risks of electoral malfeasance will increase commensurately; this will render any outcome suspect and therefore contested. Ultimately, the post-2005 constitutional order might unravel, potentially amid violence.

Making an understanding even more urgent is the uneasy state of the region. From the outset, the political system’s frailty has drawn in neighbouring states but rarely in so perilous a fashion as now. Following the U.S. troop withdrawal and the growing sectarian rift that has opened in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab uprisings, Iraq could fast become a privileged arena for a regional slug­fest.

While all attention today is focused on Syria, regional actors, the Maliki government included, appear to see Iraq as the next sectarian battleground, particularly should Bashar Assad’s regime fall. Founded in reality or not, the perception in Baghdad is that the emergence of a Sunni-dominated Syria would embolden Sunni militant groups at home; the prime minister also feels that a broad Sunni alliance led by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey has painted a target on his chest as part of their cold war with Iran and, more broadly, with Shiite Islam. Maliki has thus essentially thrown in his lot with the regime next door, notwithstanding their tense relations in years past; some neigh­bours likewise are convinced he has grown ever closer to Tehran.

It will not be easy to right the course of Iraq’s drifting ship of state, but Maliki, his opponents and neighbouring countries share an interest in reducing tensions and returning to power sharing, as the alternative could be renewed civil war with greater foreign interference. Because amending the constitution has proved near-impossible, peaceful change will have to occur through constitution-based political consensus – finally beginning to address what for too long has been ignored.

In a companion report to be released later this month, Crisis Group will highlight a specific aspect of the current crisis: the inability of one of the opposition alliances, al-Iraqiya, to present an effective barrier to Maliki’s incremental power grab. Iraqiya’s flailing efforts, along with those of other parties, to unseat Maliki through a parliamentary no-confidence vote underscore its waning power; show that what remains of the country’s secular middle class lacks an influential standard bearer at a time of ongoing sectarian tensions that Syria’s civil war risks escalating; and underline the marginalisation of Sunni Arabs and Sunni Turkomans, further increasing the potential for violence.


To All Parties in the Political Conflict:

1.  Reassert publicly their commitment to power sharing.

2.  Convene a national conference to discuss the principal issues dividing them and work with a specific and publicly-released written roadmap toward a practicable power-sharing arrangement, signed by all principal players, until the next parliamentary elections.

To Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki:

3.  Commit publicly not to seek a third term as prime minister after the next elections for the sake of national unity.

4.  Commit publicly to fully implementing the 2010 Erbil agreement.

5.  Commit publicly to holding provincial and parliamentary elections on schedule.

6.  Stop interference in the selection of commissioners for the Independent High Electoral Commission.

To the Prime Minister’s Opponents:

7.  End the effort to unseat the prime minister by a parliamentary no-confidence vote.

8.  Build on the one issue on which they agree – the need to limit the prime minister’s powers – by using their parliamentary strength to protect the independence of the Independent High Electoral Commission and pass the following key legislation, to be initiated by the president if necessary:

a) laws allowing for free and fair provincial elections in 2013 and parliamentary elections in 2014;

b) a law on the composition, selection and work of the Federal Supreme Court;

c) a political parties law; and d) federal hydrocarbons and revenue-sharing laws.

To the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq:

9.  With the international community’s support, push forward with efforts to establish a new, strong and independent board of commissioners for the Independent High Electoral Commission; provide technical expertise in organising the 2013 provincial and 2014 parliamentary elections; and mobilise the international community to closely monitor these elections.

To the Governments of Iraq and Turkey:

10.  Improve bilateral relations by:

a) ending damaging sectarian rhetoric directed at one another;

b) reestablishing contacts at the leadership level;

c) appointing high-level envoys to their counterpart’s capital who would be dedicated to restoring relations;

d) reviving the 2008 High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council; and

e) stepping up implementation of the 48 agreements on energy, security and economic cooperation signed in 2009.

To the U.S. Government:

11.  Use its leverage to:

a) press the parties to return to power sharing;

b) urge the opposition to use its parliamentary strength to push through key legislation concerning the judiciary, oil and future elections;

c) urge Maliki to cooperate with parliament to ensure these critical pieces of legislation are passed;

d) speak out publicly when the Maliki administration or any other actor violates democratic rules or when presented with evidence of human rights abuses; and

e) encourage the Iraqi government to organise provincial and parliamentary elections on schedule, and help ensure that these elections be free and fair.

To the Governments of Saudi Arabia and Other Gulf States:

12.  Accept the legitimacy of and actively engage with the Maliki government, broadening diplomatic and trade relations.

To the Governments of Iran and Turkey:

13.  Urge Prime Minister Maliki and his opponents to return to and fully implement the power-sharing arrangement contained in the 2010 Erbil agreement.